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It has long been discussed whether individuals should have a
"right to be forgotten" online to suppress old information that could
seriously interfere with their privacy and data protection rights. In the
landmark case of Google Spain v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de
Datos, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressed
the particular question of whether, under EU Data Protection Law,
individuals have a right to have links delisted from the list of search
results in searches made on the basis of their name. It found that they
do have this right-which can be best described as a "right to be
delisted"-when some conditions are met.
The ruling, which imposes on search engines the duty to assess
and accommodate delisting requests, has proven to be highly
controversial. Strong feelings have been expressed both in favor and
against the ruling, in what may be seen as a clash between the values
of personal data protection and freedom of expression.
This Article does not delve into that underlying debate. Instead,
it aims to explore the solidness of the ground on which the right is
based. It begins by providing an overview of the relevant elements of
EU data protection law so as to allow readers not familiar with its
nuances to properly follow the discussion. After presenting the facts of
Google Spain, both at national and EU level, this Article discusses how
the "right to be delisted" was crafted by the CJEU. It then argues that
the "right" is based on shaky ground, as it is premised on the
characterization of search engines as "data controllers," which is
arguably at odds with their intermediary role and-in the absence of
specific safeguards-makes their activity largely incompatible with the
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data protection legal framework. Moreover, the Article discusses how
the court failed to devise a proper balance of the different rights at
stake, particularly that of freedom of expression and information. The
Article further suggests that the intermediary role of generalist search
engines should be adequately protected, both under the data protection
legal framework as well as under the liability limitation scheme
established by the E-Commerce Directive. This protection, however, is
not likely to be achieved in the near future. A careful approach by
national courts and data protection authorities is thus suggested as a
way to fix some of the shortcomings identified in the ruling.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States should adopt the "right to be forgotten"
online. This was the motion under discussion in an Intelligence
Squared US debate held in New York on March 11, 2015.1 Two teams
put forward their arguments for and against the motion before the
audience,2 which would cast its vote at the end of the debate. The
discussion focused on whether it would be advisable for the United
States to establish a right similar to that recognized in the landmark
ruling handed down in May 13, 2014 by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), in Google Spain v. Agencia Espahola de
Protecci6n de Datos.3 There, the CJEU addressed the issue of whether
an individual may obligate a search engine's operator to remove
search results linking to information that included personal data
related to that individual.4 The CJEU found that under EU law on
personal data protection, a search engine does have the obligation,
under certain circumstances, to accommodate requests from
individuals who do not want links to information containing their
personal data displayed among search results when a search based on
their name is executed.
5
The extent of this right is broader than what people unfamiliar
with the ruling might think. Indeed, one might think that such a
right is meant to block access to defamatory statements. However,
this is not the case-defamation law has its own protection
mechanisms (i.e., a civil action on defamation). One may think, then,
that the right is confined to cases where the information is false or
inaccurate. But it is not-while the right may be exercised with
1. See Intelligence Squared Debates, intelligencesquaredus.org [perma.cc/FNR2-
HW3J]; see also Intelligence Squared Debates, The U.S. Should Adopt The 'Right To Be
Forgotten' Online, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvDzW-2qlZQ
[https://perma.cc/ZKU2-LD6S].
2. In favor of the motion were Eric Posner and Paul Nemitz. Against the motion were
Jonathan Zittrain and Andrew McLaughlin. The debate was moderated by John Donvan.
3. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (May
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regard to inaccurate information, an individual may also request the
delisting of perfectly accurate information. Then, perhaps the right
relates to the unauthorized disclosure of private information? The
ruling answered again in the negative-the concerned person may
request the removal even if the information at issue is not private.
Does it relate then to situations where the dissemination of that
information, even if accurate and public, is prejudicial to that person?
Once more, the court said no-there is no need for the dissemination
of the information to be prejudicial to the individual. However, surely
the ruling stated that the information must be somehow unlawful and
established that the original source to which the result linked also had
to be removed, right? Again, this is not necessarily so. The original
source of information, for instance a digital newspaper, might be
entitled to publish that information and to keep it online, yet the
search engine still would be obliged to not display links to it in
searches made on the basis of that person's name.
Then, did the ruling say that an individual has the right to
request the removal of links to non-defamatory, truthful, public, and
harmless information about her, even if it is lawful for the original
source to publish and keep that information online? Essentially, this
is what the court held. Specifically, it found that the right may be
exercised whenever the information is "inadequate, irrelevant, no
longer relevant or excessive," unless the public has a preponderant
right to access that information by the means of a search using the
person's name-which could be the case when that person is in the
public eye.
However broad this right may seem, the underlying situations
the court was trying to address are by no means necessarily frivolous
or unmeritorious. Very real and pressing problems for private persons
lie behind the whole idea of having some degree of control over one's
personal information online. True, the CJEU ruled out the need to
prove prejudice, but it nevertheless decided the case on the
assumption that an individual might suffer real harm as a
consequence of people stumbling on that information after typing that
individual's name into Google.
These harms have been detailed in more general debates about
the right to be forgotten. Proponents of the right have long argued
that the-web-that-never-forgets stands ever ready to produce
piecemeal fragments of old information about individuals, often
entirely out of context, that may result in serious personal
setbacks-perhaps causing someone to be denied a job, to lose social
standing, or to be unable to escape a past and build a new life. Viktor
Mayer-Schonberger has written extensively about the perils that may
arise from the fact that digital technology prevents us from forgetting
510 [Vol. 18:3:507
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and establishes remembering as the new default.6 Some of those ideas
were included in the 2012 proposal for a new EU General Data
Protection Regulation, where a provision on the "right to be forgotten"
deals more generally with the possibility of requiring the removal of
personal information from the Internet.7
Google Spain, however, did not tackle the issue of removing
information from the Internet generally, but focused on a much more
narrow aspect. It specifically considered the problem that arises when
a piece of information, which would have passed otherwise unnoticed,
buried in the archives of a newspaper or official bulletin, is brought to
the public's attention through Internet search engines. It also
addressed the fact that person-based queries may produce a more or
less detailed profile of the individual.
As will be discussed later, seeking to reach a moderate, not too
far-reaching result, the CJEU chose to creatively sidestep the question
originally posed before it. Instead of discussing whether the
individual may request the removal of said information from the
search engine's index altogether, the CJEU limited itself to
acknowledging the right to request the removal of the link from the
list of search results when a search is carried out based on the name of
that person. As a consequence, the information could still be found in
searches using terms other than person's name. In this vein, the right
6. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRPUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE (2009). The author argues that digital remembering negates time, offering a "synthetic past
reconstructed from the limited information digital memory has stored about it, an utterly skewed
patchwork devoid of time and open to manipulation in both what it contains, and what it
doesn't." Id. at 123. He puts forward that "[flrom the perspective of the person remembering,
digital memory impedes judgment. From the perspective of the person remembered, however, it
denies development, and refuses to acknowledge that all humans change all the time." Id. at 125;
see also Pere S. Castellano, The Right to be Forgotten Under European Law: A Constitutional
Debate, 16 LEX ELECTRONICA 1 (2012); Cdcile de Terwangne, Internet Privacy and the Right to Be
Forgotten/Right o Oblivion, 13 IDP REVISTA DE INTERNET, DERECHO Y POL TICA 109, 119 (2012),
http://idp.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/idp/article/view/nl3-terwangne-esp/nl3-terwangne-eng
[perma.cc/JKU3-2EJF].
7. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 17, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan.
25, 2012) [hereinafter GDPR Proposal]. In March 2014, the European Parliament adopted a First
Reading Position. In June 2015, the European Council adopted a General Approach. A final
agreement between the European Council, the European Commission, and the European
Parliament was reached on December 15, 2015. See European Commission, Press Release
IP/15/6321, Agreement on Commission's EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single
Market (Dec. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-6321_en.htm [perma.cc[BRA8-
Q4KF]. The agreed final draft is available at http://static.ow.ly/docs/
Regulationconsolidated text EN_47uW.pdf [perma.cc/6CHE-UE2N] [hereinafter GDPR final
draft]. The GDPR is expected to be officially adopted in the first months of 2016, and would enter
into force in spring 2018.
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envisioned by the CJEU can be best described as a "right to be
delisted."
8
From a US law perspective, both the more general "right to be
forgotten" envisioned in the proposal for the EU General Data
Protection Regulation or the more specific search engines' duty to
delist seem difficult to accommodate;9 although it has been noted that
US law also recognizes some limited forms of a right to be forgotten.10
Many US commentators oppose a right with such a broad reach,'1
though they acknowledge that it attempts to address an important
problem.12 In contrast, others have shown sympathy for this new
development,13 and some observers have noted that, in fact, US
privacy law might already be leaning towards a more European
approach.14
This Article seeks to shed light on the "right to be delisted" by
providing valuable insight into how this right ended up being
acknowledged by the CJEU on the basis of the EU legal framework on
8. The term "right to be delisted" has already been used in the literature. See, e.g.,
Brendan van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek, Internet and Jurisdiction After Google Spain: The
Extraterritorial Reach of the "Right to be Delisted, " 5 INT'L DATA PRIVACY LAW 105 (2015).
9. See, e.g., Ravi Antani, The Resistance of Memory: Could the European Union's Right
to be Forgotten Exist in the United States? 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173, 1183 (2015); Robert Lee
Bolton III, The Right To Be Forgotten: Forced Amnesia In A Technological Age, 31 J. MARSHALL
J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 133, 144 (2014) (noting public policy objections to a right to be
forgotten); Thomas H. Koenig and Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 633 (2015) ("If the U.S.
adopts a digital eraser, it will be more limited that the EU's right to be forgotten because of the
need to balance expression with the right to a reputational fresh start."); Robert K. Walker, The
Right to be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 261 (2012) (arguing that only a limited form of the
"right to be forgotten,"-namely, the right to delete voluntarily submitted data, would be
compatible with US constitutional law).
10. Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU Ruling on the Right to Be
Forgotten (May 13, 2014), https://www.linkedin.comlpulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-
google-must-forget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten [perma.cc/9XGZ-9YK3] ("[T]he
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act provides for a right to delete personal data. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act restricts the ability of consumer reporting agencies to report on
bankruptcies and criminal proceedings that are beyond a certain number of years old.").
11. Regarding the right to be forgotten as drafted in the GDPR Proposal, supra note 7;
see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012) (arguing
that it "represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade").
12. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Don't Force Google to 'Forget,' N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?r=O
[https://perma.cc/8FD4-ZZSR].
13. See Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to be Forgotten, SLATE, May 14, 2014; see
also Koenig & Rustad, supra note 9, at 634 ('The EU's 'right to erasure' provision would be
particularly useful to America's poor and less educated who seek to remove evidence of their
spoiled identity.").
14. See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 365
(2013) (putting forward that American privacy law is starting to move in the direction of the
European framework).
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data protection, thus enabling a better understanding of the right, and
its shortcomings. Part II offers an introduction to the current EU
legal framework on data protection, covering the most relevant
concepts to the crafting of this right. That discussion is meant to
provide readers not familiar with its nuances enough information so
as to easily follow the legal discussion. The peculiar notion of data
protection as a fundamental right to control one's personal data, which
goes beyond the notion of privacy, is essential to understand the
CJEU's recognition of this right. Part III presents the facts and main
holdings of the landmark Google Spain case. Part IV moves on to
discuss the legal ground of the right to be delisted. Section IV.A
argues that the right is on shaky ground, as its main premise under
the EU legal framework on data protection-the characterization of a
search engine as a "data controller"-is problematic.15 Section IV.B
puts forward the need to protect search engines' intermediary role. It
both discusses their legal status under the liability limitations set
forth in EU law and also suggests that data protection law should take
this role into account, thus crafting specific provisions to avoid
imposing a bundle of obligations on search engines that are at odds
with their actual functions and possibilities. Section IV.C further
discusses the specific legal basis and conditions to request delisting.
Section IV.D explores the shortcomings that can be identified in the
balancing of rights envisioned by the CJEU. Next, Part V considers if
the scenario may change under the General Data Protection
Regulation and suggests that national courts and data protection
authorities carry out a careful balancing in the particular cases
brought before them to overcome some of the problems detected.
Finally, a brief conclusion summing up the arguments of the paper is
provided in Part VI.
The audience in the Intelligence Squared debate was not
ultimately persuaded to adopt a right to be forgotten in the United
States-nonetheless, other polls suggest that American citizens would
approve of the right's adoption.'6 Unsurprisingly, the assertion that
individuals have a right to even limited control of what search engines
may display in search results about themselves is rather
controversial.'7 There are many assumptions involved, including
15. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsfnum=C-131/12 [perma.cc/V4LK-Y9CZ], 41.
16. See Daniel Humphries, U.S. Attitudes Toward the 'Right to Be Forgotten,' SOFTWARE
ADVICE, (Sep. 5, 2014), http://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-
forgotten-2014/ [perma.cc/3GQJ-QNVW] (finding that "6 1% of Americans believe some version of
the right to be forgotten is necessary").
17. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 10; Sophie Curtis & Alice Philipson, Wikipedia Founder:
EU's Right to be Forgotten is 'Deeply Immoral,' TELEGRAPH, Aug. 6, 2014; Washington Post's
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different visions of key ideological aspects of the right, which have
sometimes made the academic and social discussion vehement. This
Article will not take sides on that front. However, in exploring the
nuances of this right within the legal context in which it emerged, this
Article will underscore some of the right's problems and call for an
approach that better reflects the intermediary nature of search
engines. All in all, this Article seeks to contribute to a better
understanding of a right which appears to have come to stay in the
EU and may certainly influence legal developments in other
jurisdictions.
II. THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
The right to the "protection of personal data" is recognized by
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ("Charter"),18 where it is
separately established in Article 819 from the right to "respect for
private and family life," laid down in Article 7.20 This autonomous
characterization in the Charter represented a notable departure from
the traditional understanding of data protection as a mere facet of the
right to privacy.21 Now recognized as a fundamental right, data
Editorial Board, European Union is Forcing Google to 'Forget' Some Links in a Blow to Public
Information, WASH. POST, May 15, 2014.
18. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391 [hereinafter Charter]. The Charter had been proclaimed in 2000 at the Nice European
Council but did not obtain immediate legal effect. It only became legally binding-in a slightly
modified version-on December 1, 2009, when the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.
Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon,
states that the Union recognizes "the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter...
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties." Consolidated version of the Treaty on the
European Union art. 6, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 19 [hereinafter TEU].
19. Art. 8 of the Charter, supra note 18, reads as follows:
Article 8. Protection of personal data:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent
authority.
Art. 8 of the Charter, supra note 18.
20. On the character of data protection and privacy as independent rights, see Orla
Lynskey, Deconstructing Data Protection: The "Added- Value'of a Right to Data Protection in the
EU Legal Order, 63 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 569 (2014) (arguing that even though the rights to
privacy and data protection significantly overlap, they are distinct rights, as the latter offers
additional benefits and enhanced protection in the context of personal data processing, in
particular by promoting individual personality rights and reducing information and power
asymmetries).
21. On this evolution, see GLORIA GONZALEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (2014).
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protection enjoys the highest status within EU law-along with the
rest of fundamental rights equally recognized by the Charter. The
right is also recognized in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU (TFEU), which refers particularly to the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by EU
institutions.22
Before the EU embarked on the adoption of a catalogue of
fundamental rights, the 1995 Data Protection Directive ("Directive")23
laid down a legal framework for data protection that is still in force.24
A substantial overhaul of the EU data protection regime is being
prepared in the form of a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
which is expected to be formally adopted in the first months of 2016,
and would enter into force in 2018, two years after its official
publication.25 This Article deals primarily with the Directive because
it both constitutes the current main piece of EU secondary legislation
in relation to data protection and is the legal framework under which
Google Spain was decided. Nonetheless, appropriate reference will
also be made to how the right to be delisted might be affected by the
GDPR.
The purpose of the following Sections is to provide a brief
overview of the key elements in the Directive, particularly those which
are most relevant to discussing Google Spain-readers already
familiar with the main elements of the Directive may want to skip this
Part and go directly to Part III.
22. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 55, art. 16 [hereinafter TFEU]. This Treaty is the result of
amending and renaming the Treaty establishing the European Community (the TEC Treaty) by
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Art. 16 TFEU replaced the old art. 286 TEC, which was introduced
in 1997, two years after the passing of the Directive 95/46-to which we will immediately refer.
Since Directives are addressed to Member States, this art. 286 TEC was introduced so that the
legal framework on data protection would apply as well to the Community institutions and
bodies.
23. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
24. There are other instruments of secondary legislation that complete the EU legal
framework for data protection, but we will not need to deal with them for the purposes of this
Article. Those instruments include Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37; and Regulation 4512001, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard To the
Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1.
25. See GDPR final draft, supra note 7.
515
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
A. Some Key Elements of the Data Protection Directive
In a nutshell, the Directive covers the "processing" of "personal
data" and sets out the conditions for that processing to be lawful.
Lawful processing requires, in the first place, a legitimate base.26 This
may be either the consent given by the person to whom the personal
data relate-called the "data subject"-or any other of the legitimacy
grounds specifically provided for in the Directive. In addition, the
processing must respect the "data quality" principle,27 which seeks to
ensure, inter alia, that the data are adequate, relevant, and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected or
further processed. Some other obligations must also be observed,
including those relating to the confidentiality and security of the
processing, the notifications to the supervisory authority, or the
transfer of personal data to third countries. More stringent
requirements and safeguards are established for the processing of
sensitive data (i.e., "data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership,"
and "data concerning health or sex life").
28
Two categories of subjects involved in the processing of data
are identified-namely, the "controller" and other "processors," and
different sets of legal duties are imposed on them. The Directive
further determines the rights of the "data subject," which include the
right to be informed about the collection of data and its processing, as
well as the rights of access to data, rectification, erasure or blocking of
data, and the right to object to the processing under the appropriate
circumstances.
As to its territorial scope, the Directive applies not only to
controllers established in the territory of the EU or the European
Economic Area (EEA),29 but also to those established outside the EU
or EEA in some circumstances, including the case where "the
processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an
establishment of the controller" located in the territory of an EU or
EEA Member State.
30
26. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 7.
27. Id. art. 6.
28. Id. art. 8.
29. The European Economic Area (EEA) includes all EU Member States and three
non-EU members, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
30. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 4(l)(a). The same provision sets
forth that "when the same controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he
must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the
obligations laid down by the national law applicable." Id.
516 [Vol. 18:3:507
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The Directive also envisions both an administrative and
judicial system of enforcement. It requires that, in each Member
State, one or more independent authorities, called Data Protection
Authorities (DPAs), supervise the application of the national law
implementing the Directive. These DPAs are vested with powers
including hearing claims, investigating, and effectively
intervening-for instance, ordering the blocking, erasure, or
destruction of data; imposing a temporary or definitive ban on
processing; or warning or admonishing the controller. They may also
have the power to impose economic sanctions provided for by the
national law in cases of infringement of the provisions implementing
the Directive. Decisions by DPAs can be appealed before the courts.
All EU Member States are obliged to implement the Directive
into their national law. While they are free to choose the particular
way or method of implementation or "transposition," they must
achieve the results prescribed by the Directive.31 Moreover, according
to the so-called principle of consistent interpretation--or
interprdtation conforme-when applying the measures implementing
the Directive, national courts must interpret the domestic law in a
way that is consistent with EU law.
32
When a Member State's court harbors doubts on how to
interpret EU law, it may stay the proceedings and request hat the
Court of Justice of the European Union give a preliminary ruling on
the matter.33  These preliminary rulings do not decide on the
particular facts of the case, but rather on the interpretation that
should be given to EU law. They answer the specific legal questions
raised by the national court, which should then proceed with the case
and render a final ruling.34 In this way, CJEU judgments form a body
of case law that interprets EU law and guides national courts'
31. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 288 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the result to
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods.").
32. See Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Apr. 10,
1984, E.C.R. 1891, 1909 ("[Inn applying the national law and in particular the provisions of a
national law specifically introduced in order to implement [a] Directive . .. national courts are
required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the
directive in order to achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of Article [288 TUEF]");
see also Katrine Sawyer, The Principle of "Interpr6tation Conforme": How Far Can or Should
National Courts Go When Interpreting National Legislation Consistently With European
Community Law?, 28 STATUTE L. REV. 3 (2007).
33. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 267. In some cases-namely, "when the question is
raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law," it is not an option, but an obligation for the
national court to make the reference for a preliminary ruling. See id.
34. See id.
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application of their own national law in a manner consistent with EU
law.
A crucial role in the interpretation of the Directive is played in
practice by the so-called Article 29 Working Party (WP29)-an
advisory body composed of a representative of each Member State's
DPA, a representative of the European Data Protection Supervisor,
35
and a representative of the European Commission.36 The WP29
advises the European Commission and regularly delivers opinions,
recommendations, and reports on not only issues covered by the
Directive, but also generally on any question regarding data
protection.37 While its opinions are not binding, they constitute in
practice a powerful guidance for the interpretation of the Directive
and thus for the application of the national transposition measures,
both by DPAs and national courts.
B. The Pivotal Notions of "Personal Data," "Processing," and
"Controller"
The legal concepts of "personal data," "processing," and
"controller" are key building blocks of the Directive that are conceived
in a very broad way. "Personal data" is defined as "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person," or "data
subject."38  In turn, an "identifiable person" is "one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly"-either by the controller or by any
other person-"in particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity. '39 In its preamble, the Directive
notes that "to determine whether a person is identifiable, account
35. The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is the independent authority
responsible for overseeing the processing of data by the EU institutions and bodies. It is
established in art. 41 of the Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard To the Processing Of Personal
Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and On the Free Movement of Such Data, 2001
O.J. (L 8) 1.
36. The Working Party is set up by Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive. See art.
29 Data Protection Working Party, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protectionlarticle-29/indexen.htm [perma.cc/87W7-V28N].
37. The opinions, recommendations, and reports adopted by Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party are available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/index-en.htm [perma.cc/87W7-V28N].
38. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 2(a).
39. See id. For a comparison between the European notion of personal data and the
parallel concept of "personally identifiable information" in the United States, see Paul M.
Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and
European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877 (2014) (proposing a tiered approach to the concept of
"personally identifiable information" so as to bridge the differences between the EU and the US
frameworks).
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should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by
the controller or by any other person to identify the said person"40 and
excludes "data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data
subject is no longer identifiable."
41
Assessing what is personal data under the Directive has proven
difficult in some cases, leading to uncertainty and to divergent
interpretations in different EU Member States. The WP29 issued an
opinion on this matter in 2007, contributing interpretation criteria for
a uniform understanding of the concept.42 The opinion makes it clear
that the information considered as personal data is not limited to
information related to the individuals' private life; instead, it may be
any kind of information.43 According to the WP29, there is no need to
know someone's name for that person to be "identifiable"; rather it
may be enough that this person can be "singled out," for instance with
a unique identifier.
44
The notion of "processing" is defined as "any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.'45 It is difficult to
think of any action that could fall outside this all-embracing
definition. Indeed, the method chosen by the Directive to limit the
reach of its rules is not to limit the notion of what constitutes data
processing, but rather to exclude some types of actual data processing
from its scope.
The following limitations should be noted in this respect. First,
the Directive only applies to "the processing of personal data wholly or
partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system
or are intended to form part of a filing system.'46  Second, the
processing operations concerning public security, defense, state
security, activities of the state in areas of criminal law, and other
40. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, Recital 26 (emphasis added).
41. See id.
42. Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, (1248/07/EN)
WP 136, Jun. 20, 2007.
43. See id. at 6.
44. See id. at 14.
45. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 2(b).
46. Id. art. 3(1). Therefore, some residual operations are not governed by the
Directive-namely, those which do not use automatic means at all and where the data are not
going to be included in a "filing system"--that is, in a "structured set of personal data which are
accessible according to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a
functional or geographical basis." Id. art. 2(c).
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similar instances are also excluded.47 Third, the Directive contains a
so-called "household exception," which leaves outside its scope the
processing of personal data carried out "by a natural person in the
course of a purely personal or household activity. '48 Finally, Article 9
of the Directive mandates that Member States provide exceptions for
the processing of data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or for
the purpose of artistic or literary expression, inasmuch as they are
necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the right to freedom of
expression.49 The extent of these eventual exceptions for freedom of
expression depends thus on each member state's national law.
50
Another key notion in the Directive is the already mentioned
concept of "controller," defined as "the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data.15 1 The controller is responsible for most of the duties imposed by
the Directive. In contrast, more limited obligations are imposed on a
mere "processor," the natural or legal person that processes personal
data on behalf of the controller.
52
C. Conditions for Lawful Processing
For the processing of personal data to be lawful-leaving aside
some exceptions provided for in the Directive-it must comply with
certain conditions, which include that of having a legitimate basis and
that of respecting the principle of data quality.
53
Regarding the legitimacy of the processing, the Directive
provides for several possible grounds.5 4 The first one, already pointed
47. Id. art. 3(2).
48. Id. The exception has been interpreted in a very narrow way. For instance, the
WP29 notes that having a high number of contacts in a social networking site "could be an
indication that the household exception does not apply and therefore that the user would be
considered a data controller." See Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social
networking (01189/09/EN) WP 163, Jun. 12, 2009, at 6.
49. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 9. For more on the origins and
interpretation of this provision, see David Erdos, From the Scylla of Restriction to the Charybdis
of License? Exploring the Present and Future Scope of the 'Special Purposes' Freedom of
Expression Shield in European Data Protection, 52 COMMON MKT L. REV. 119 (2015).
50. See Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist (Nov. 6, 2003) 90 [hereinafter Lindqvist].
51. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 2(d).
52. Id. art. 2(e).
53. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, Articles 6 and 7; see also Article 8 of
the Charter, supra note 19.
54. The CJEU has declared that Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive "sets out an
exhaustive and restrictive list of cases in which the processing of personal data can be regarded
as being lawful." See Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, ASNEF and FECEMD, Nov. 24, 2011,
30 [hereinafter ASNEF and FECEMD].
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out, is the data subject's consent for the processing. In the absence of
consent, the processing may still be legitimate under another of the
alternative grounds provided for in Article 7. One of those grounds,
set forth in Article 7(f), covers the situation where the "processing is
necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed.' 55 However, Article 7(f) does not provide an absolute basis
because it expressly excludes the case where those interests "are
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the
data subject."56 A balance is thus required to determine if a particular
case of processing may rely on that ground for lawfulness.
57
Data processing must also respect the data quality
requirements laid down in Article 6. Accordingly, personal data must
be collected for specific purposes and not further processed in a way
that is incompatible with those purposes. Likewise, data must be
"adequate, relevant and not excessive" in relation to the purposes of
the processing and be "accurate and, where necessary, kept up to
date," and the provision establishes that "every reasonable step must
be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete,
having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for
which they are further processed, are erased or rectified."58  In
addition, data must be "kept in a form which permits identification of
data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed,"59 and Member States must "lay down appropriate
safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical,
statistical or scientific use."
60
55. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 7(0.
56. Id.
57. While under Article 5 of the Data Protection Directive, EU Member States have
some room for flexibility in determining more precisely how this balance should be achieved,
they may not introduce additional requirements to benefit from this ground of lawful processing.
See ASNEF and FECEMD, supra note 54, 36-39. The WP29 released a detailed opinion in
2014 providing criteria on how this balance should be carried out. See Art. 29 Working Party
Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of
Directive 95/46/EC (844/14/EN) WP 217, Apr. 9, 2014.
58. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 6(b)-(d).
59. Id. art. 6(e). See Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for a General Data
Protection Regulation and the Roots of the 'Right to Be Forgotten,' 29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY
REV. 229, 233 (2013) (putting forward that a dissemination of old facts with no relationship with
the present lifestyle or activities of the concerned individual "has to be considered an
unnecessarily long processing of data and therefore constitutes an incompatible way of managing
the data in relation to the initial purposes").
60. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 6(e).
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D. The Right to Have the Data Erased and to Object to its Lawful
Processing
The Data Protection Directive grants a number of specific
rights to the person whose personal data are being processed. Two of
them will be of particular relevance for the CJEU's recognition of what
may be called a "right to be delisted." First, the data subject has the
right to have the data "erased." Article 12(b) of the Directive
establishes that every data subject will have "the right to obtain from
the controller ... as appropriate, the rectification, erasure or blocking
of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of
this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate
nature of the data.'61 This right is thus conditioned on the fact that
the processing does not respect the requirements set out in the
Directive and hence cannot be deemed lawful. The specific reference
to the "incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data" is just an example
of a situation where the processing would not comply with the data
quality principles laid down in Article 6.62
Even where the processing fully complies with the provisions of
the Directive, including the data quality principle, a data subject may
still "object" to that processing in some situations. This "right to
object" is provided for in Article 14, which obliges EU Member States
to grant the data subject the right "to object at any time on compelling
legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the
processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by
national legislation.'63 However, the nature of those "compelling
legitimate grounds" is not specified in the Directive. If the objection
raised is justified, then "the processing instigated by the controller
may no longer involve those data.
'64
III. GOOGLE SPAIN
A. How the Case Originated and Reached the CJEU
In 1998, La Vanguardia-a newspaper based in
Barcelona-published an official announcement of auctions of real
61. Id. art. 12(b) (emphasis added).
62. In this case, the data processing would fail to comply with id. art. 6(d) ("[lPersonal
data must be ... (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must
be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes
for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified
63. Id. art. 14(a) (emphasis added).
64. Id.
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estate properties following attachment procedures for the recovery of
Social Security debts.65 A person by the name of Mario Costeja
Gonzilez was named in the announcement as co-owner of one of the
properties.66  There was nothing untrue or inaccurate in the
information provided. It appears that Mr. Costeja eventually fixed his
problems regarding the debt and the property, and the matter was put
behind him.67 Ten years later, La Vanguardia digitized its archives
and put them online, including the digitized version of all its daily
paper-based editions.68 The rest of the story is easy to imagine. One
day Mr. Costeja typed his name into Google only to find that some of
the first results were links to the pages in the newspaper's archive
with the notice of the real estate auction, which brought back to life an
old and long-forgotten episode.
In November 2009, Mr. Costeja asked La Vanguardia to erase
his data, noting that the problem had long been resolved and the
information was not relevant anymore.69 On the following day, La
Vanguardia answered him in the negative, stating that erasure was
not appropriate, as the notice was published following an official
order.70 Mr. Costeja then turned to Google Spain SL, the Spanish
subsidiary of Google Inc.71 In its answer, Google Spain told him that
he should instead contact Google Inc. in the United States, as the
latter was the entity that actually ran the search engine.72 In March
2010, he filed a complaint before the Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n
65. The announcement, written in Catalan language, appeared in the editions of
January 19, 1998, p. 23 and March 9, 1998, p. 13. See La Vanguardia (Mar. 9, 1998),
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/03/09/pagina- 13/33837533/pdf.html
[perma.cc[DA8Y-NNM8].
66. See id. Article 117 of the General Regulation on the Collection of Social Security
Contributions provides that the announcement of the auction of seized goods may be published in
mass communication media with big circulation or in specialized publications if it is convenient
to the end sought and proportionate to the value of the goods. The same article establishes that
the announcement of the auction will include, inter alia, a description of the goods and its
ownership. Spanish Royal Decree 1415/2004, Jun. 11 2004, http://www.boe.es/
diarioiboe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2004-11836 [perma.cc/R8J2-KDW7].
67. See Audiencia Nacional, Reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of
the European Union of Feb. 27, 2012, Google Spain, Google Inc., v AEDP, Mario Costeja
Gonzdlez, ECLI:ES:AN:2012:19A, at 1-2, http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/indexAN.jsp
[https:Hperma.cc/3G7J-JABX] (searching for ECLI:ES:AN:2012:19A) [hereinafter AN Reference
Google Spain]. It must be noted that in Spain the names of individuals are anonymized in the
published version of court rulings, where fictitious names are used instead. In this case, the
name of Mario Costeja Gonzilez was changed into that of "Carlos Jos6."
68. See Redacci6n, 'La Vanguardia' ofrece acceso gratuito en internet a sus 127 aiios de
hemeroteca, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 26, 2008, http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/
2008/10/26/pagina-40/74887891/pdf.html?search=hemeroteca [https:H!perma.cc/RFP2-23TC].
69. See AN Reference Google Spain, supra note 67, at 1-2.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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de Datos (AEPD)-the Spanish DPA-against La Vanguardia, Google
Spain SL, and Google Inc.
73
The AEPD initiated a so-called "procedure for the protection of
rights"-a procedure available to data subjects seeking to oblige
controllers to respect their rights of access, rectification, erasure, or
objection-but only against Google Spain and Google Inc., leaving the
news publisher out.74 The procedure ended with a decision handed
down by the AEPD on July 30, 2010, 75 which upheld the claimant's
petition against Google Spain and Google Inc., ordering the search
engine "to adopt the necessary measures to remove the data from its
index and prevent future access to them.
'76
In its decision, the Spanish authority built on the premise that
an ordinary citizen-one who is neither a public figure nor is involved
in some publicly relevant event-need not resign herself to having her
personal data available on the Internet.77 It noted, nonetheless, that
requiring prior consent from individuals before data are put online or
imposing the obligation to establish preventive filtering mechanisms
might pose too high an obstacle for the exercise of the rights to
freedom of expression and information, and thus be a sort of
censorship, which would be constitutionally barred.78 Having said
that, the AEPD asserted that, once the data appear online, ordinary
citizens must have the possibility to react-for instance, by means of
the right to erasure.79 Thus, the AEPD concluded that Mr. Costeja's
73. Id.
74. The AEPD considered that the newspaper rightly rejected Mr. Costeja's request,
since the publication of the announcement had been decided by the official body in charge of
carrying out the auction, with the aim of giving maximum publicity to it so that as many bidders
as possible could participate-an argument that, in itself, however, hardly accounts for the need
to keep that information available after so many years. See Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de
Datos, Decision n' R/01680/2010 of July 30, 2010, procedure TD-00650-2010 against Google Inc.,
Google Spain S.L. and La Vanguardia Ediciones S.L., at 22-23, http://www.agpd.es/ (searching
for TD-00650-2010) [hereinafter AEPD Costeja].
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added). Apparently, the obligation was imposed on Google Inc.,
though the wording of the decision is not very clear. The decision states that it upholds "the
complaint brought by Mr. Costeja against Google Spain S.L. and against Google Inc." and orders
"this entity" (which grammatically would indicate only the latter-that is, Google Inc.) to remove
the data and prevent future access to them. However, saying that it upholds the complaint
against Google Spain and Google Inc. seems to indicate that the Spanish company is also
considered responsible for the removal. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 23. The CJEU,
nonetheless, depicts the AEPD decision as ordering only Google Inc. to remove the data from the
index. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (May 13,
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisfliste.jsf?num=C-131/12, 2.
77. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 20 (quoting AEPD Decision n' R/00598/2007 of
Jul. 7, 2007, procedure TD-00266-2007 against T-Online Telecomunications Spain, S.A.U.,
http://www.agpd.es/ [https://perma.cc/AKD3-7HFP](searching for TD-00266-2007)).
78. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 20.
79. Id.
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petition to have his personal data erased should be upheld to avoid
permanent effects against his will. 80
The AEPD decision did not elaborate much on whether or not
the claimant's petition met the legal requirements. In particular, the
decision did not expressly discuss whether the right to erasure was
appropriate because the processing did not comply with the provisions
of the Directive;81 nor was there a discussion as to whether the data
subject had "compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular
situation" on which to object to the processing.8 2  Likewise, the
decision contained no discussion as to whether Google fit the legal
notion of a controller. The AEPD simply assumed that
"Google"-without really distinguishing between the parent and the
subsidiary-was in fact a controller. The decision did quote a passage
of a WP29 opinion that considers a search engine to be a controller.8 3
However, the quoted passage does not relate to the processing of the
data included in the linked-to websites, but instead to the processing
of Google users' data-thus hardly applying to the case at hand.4
Google Spain SL argued that it was neither a controller nor a
processor of the personal data included on the websites listed in the
search results, because it limited itself to promoting the selling of
advertising space and did not intervene in the activity of the search
engine.8 5 Rather, its parent company, Google Inc., solely provided the
search services and carried out all the functions relating to the
indexing and provision of search results.8 6 Google Spain SL also
contended that EU data protection law was not applicable to the US
company. Finally, Google Spain SL argued that Google Inc. could not
be deemed the controller in any event because the main entities
responsible for the processing were the publishers of the websites
where the personal data had been included.8 7 All these contentions
80. Id.
81. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 12(b).
82. See id. art. 14(a). In fact, however surprising it may be, it is not clear at all from the
text of the AEPD decision whether Mr. Costeja had exercised the right of erasure or the right to
object-or both. Remarkably enough, throughout the AEPD decision, the words "right to erasure"
and "right to object" are used interchangeably as if they were synonyms, whereas, as we have
seen in the previous Part, they are in fact independent rights, each one having its own conditions
and requisites in the law. In its final part, the AEPD decision seemed to refer specifically to the
right to object, without any reference to the compelling legitimate grounds of the data subject.
83. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 8.
84. See Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to
Search Engines (737/EN) WP 148, at 9, Apr. 4, 2008 [hereinafter WP29 Opinion on Search
Engines].
85. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 2-3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3. That was the reason why when the claimant asked Google Spain SL to
erase the data, it did not answer the petition and instead conveyed it to Google Inc., which in
525
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
were rejected by the AEPD, though some of them were rejected only by
implication.88 The AEPD placed its greatest effort on justifying that
Spanish law and the Data Protection Directive did apply to Google,
asserting several arguments to that effect, including that the
processing was carried out "in the context of the activities of an
establishment" of Google in Spain.
89
Both Google Spain and Google Inc., in separate briefs, appealed
the AEPD decision before the Audiencia Nacional (AN), the competent
court for the review of the administrative decisions issued by the
AEPD. Though this particular case would end up being a landmark
one, at this stage there was nothing special about it. Dozens of similar
appeals, which posed important questions regarding the proper
interpretation of EU data protection law, were being brought before
the AN.
The AN decided to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to
the CJEU,90 simply picking the Costeja case out of the many cases
appealed before it.91 The AN posed three groups of questions to the
CJEU. Regarding the territorial scope, the AN harbored doubts about
the AEPD's interpretation of the connecting factors, particularly
regarding the fact that the processing is carried out in the context of
the activities of an establishment of Google Inc. located in Spain.
92
The AN considered it proven that the operation of the search engine
was exclusively carried out by the parent company based in California.
Nonetheless, it noted that the activity of the subsidiary, the promotion
and sale of advertising space, might be deemed closely linked to the
operation of the search engine, as the advertisements were displayed
along with the search results. The AN asked the CJEU whether it
must be considered that an "establishment," within the meaning of the
Directive, exists "when the undertaking providing the search engine
sets up in a Member State an office or subsidiary for the purpose of
turn responded to the claimant that he should direct himself to the publisher-La
Vanguardia-as this was the only way to get the data erased or blocked. See id.
88. See id. at 2-3.
89. See id. at 14-15. This would trigger the applicability of the DP Directive. See Data
Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 4(l)(a).
90. See generally AN Reference Google Spain, supra note 67.
91. At the time of the reference, there were some 130 appeals pending before the
Audiencia Nacional. See id. at 16.
92. See id. at 8-9. That connecting factor is set forth in Article 4(1)(a) of the Data
Protection Directive. The AN asked as well for the interpretation of the connecting factor
consisting of the use of equipment in the territory of a Member State-Article 4(1)(c)-and even
asked if other connecting factors, not provided for in the Directive, might also be taken into
account, such as the location of the conflict's center of gravity. Id.
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promoting and selling advertising space on the search engine, which
orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that State."
93
The second set of questions the AN posed to the CJEU related
to how Google's activity as a search engine fit in the Directive.9 4
Particularly, the AN asked whether the indexation and location of
search results constituted a processing of the personal data included
in the linked contents and, if so, whether Google could be deemed a
controller with respect to that processing under the Directive. The AN
noted that the fact that the indexation of the information was carried
out automatically and without any actual control over its accuracy or
truthfulness warranted doubts as to whether the search engine could
be considered a controller.95 Even if it were to fall within the notion of
controller, the question would arise as to the extent of its obligations,
particularly with regard to the right to erasure and the right to object.
In this vein, the AN asked the CJEU whether the data protection
authority might directly order the search engine to remove from its
index a piece of information published by a third party, without
addressing itself in advance or simultaneously to the publisher.96 The
AN asked as well if the search engine would be excluded from the
removal obligation where the information at stake was lawfully
published by third parties and maintained on the publisher's web
page.9
7
The last group of questions regarded the scope of the right to
erasure and the right to object.98 The AN inquired whether those
rights would allow the data subject to request the removal of the
information based simply on his or her wish that the information be
consigned to oblivion, thus not necessarily depending on whether it
might be prejudicial to him or her.
B. Finding a Right to Be Delisted Under the Data Protection Directive
The landmark ruling handed down by the CJEU was in line
with its recent case law underscoring and strengthening the right to
data protection, particularly in the light of its recognition as a
fundamental right in the Charter.99 The ruling was preceded by the
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 13-15.
99. A remarkable example of this trend is the CJEU's judgment in the Digital Rights
Ireland case, which declared the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC to be invalid. See Joined
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Advocate General's (AG) opinion.100 The AG had concluded that, while
the Directive does apply, a search engine cannot be considered a
controller of the data processing except in limited situations.10 1 The
AG had further found that even if a search engine were to be
considered a controller, a data subject could not prevent a search
engine from indexing personal information legally published on third
parties' web pages, invoking that it might be prejudicial to her or that
she wishes it to be forgotten.102 As to the core issues-the search
engine's characterization as a controller and the scope of the data
subject's rights to erasure and to object-the CJEU judgment
substantially departed from the answers proposed by the AG.
The CJEU found that a search engine's activity amounts to a
processing of the personal data contained on the Internet pages it
indexes and makes available to the public through the search results.
However, it held, in contrast to the AG's conclusions, that the search
engine determines the purposes and the means of that processing, and
thus must be regarded as a controller103 According to the CJEU, this
processing "can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried
out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an
internet page.'0 4  Such processing could significantly affect data
subjects' rights, because users who carry out searches on the basis of
an individual's name are able to obtain a structured overview of the
information relating to that person available on the Internet. Those
users thus can "establish a more or less detailed profile of the data
subject.'01 5 As a controller, the CJEU noted, a search engine "must
Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc'ns, para. 73 (Apr. 8,
2014).
100. In a procedure for a preliminary ruling before the CJEU, the Advocate General (AG)
assigned to the case must submit an opinion proposing how to answer the questions posed by the
referring court. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, art. 82,
2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, 22. Where the court decides that the case raises no new point of law, it may
decide to proceed without a submission from the Advocate General. See Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, art. 20, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 210, 215. While the AG opinions are not
binding, it is not uncommon for the CJEU to end up adopting the solutions proposed by the AG.
See Cyril Ritter, A New Look At the Role and Impact of Advocates-General-Collectively and
Individually, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 751, 763 (2006) (examining the impact of Advocate General's
opinions and noting that they have been a driving force behind changes and evolutions in the
court's jurisprudence).
101. See Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL,
Google Inc. v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos, Mario Costeja GonzAlez, 138 (June 25,
2013) [hereinafter AG Opinion].
102. Id.
103. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
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ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and
capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive."'
10 6
As to the applicability of the Directive, the CJEU concluded
that it does apply to Google, stating that "when the operator of a
search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which
is intended to promote and sell advertising space offered by that
engine and which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of
that Member State,"' 10 7 that processing "is carried out in the context of
the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of a
Member State,"108 which triggers the applicability of the Directive
pursuant to Article 4(1)(a).
In analyzing whether the data subject could indeed require the
erasure of the data or object to the processing-in the form of
requesting the delisting of the links-the CJEU pointed out that all
processing of personal data must both comply with the data quality
conditions0 9 and be based on one of the legitimacy grounds set out in
the Directive.110  Regarding legitimacy, the CJEU expressly
acknowledged that the processing by a search engine "is capable of
being covered by the ground in Article 7(f)," 111 which-as noted
earlier-considers the case where the data processing "is necessary for
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by
the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except
where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject."''
2
If the processing lacks a legitimate ground or fails to meet any
of the data quality requirements, the data subject would have the
right to obtain from the controller, as appropriate, the erasure of the
data. Furthermore, even if the processing both respects the data
quality requirements and is based on a legitimate ground, the data
subject could still object to the processing on compelling legitimate
grounds relating to her particular situation, except where national
legislation provided otherwise.11 3  The data subject could address
directly her requests to the search engine, "who must then duly
examine their merits and, as the case may be, end processing of the
106. Id. 38.
107. Id. 60.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 6.
110. See id. art. 7.
111. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsfnum=C-131/12 [https://perma.cc/8V2T-
CLRR], 73.
112. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 7(0.
113. See id. art. 14(b).
529
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
data in question.'114 Where the search engine did not grant the
request, the data subject could resort to the DPA or the judicial
authority, who would then assess the request and potentially order
the controller to take the appropriate measures.
1 5
In any of those situations, a balancing of the opposing rights
and interests must be carried out to evaluate the data subject request.
In this respect, the CJEU emphasized that that balancing must duly
take into account "the significance of the data subject's rights arising
from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.""6 Noting that search engine
processing "is liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to
privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by
means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual's
name,"117 the CJEU held that the potentially serious interference
"cannot be justified by merely the economic interest which the
operator of such an engine has in that processing."' 18 Therefore, the
elements to weigh in the balancing should be the data subject's
fundamental rights measured against the "the legitimate interest of
internet users potentially interested in having access to that
information."' 19 However, the possibility of actually balancing those
elements was sharply reduced by the CJEU, as it stated that "data
subject's rights protected by [Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter] also
override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users."120
Nonetheless, the court noted that in specific cases, this could depend
"on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the
data subject's private life and on the interest of the public in having
that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according
to the role played by the data subject in public life."' 2
In addition, the CJEU answered that the obligation of the
controller to end the processing is not conditioned on the fact that the
publisher removed the information previously or simultaneously from
the web page, and the controller's obligation is not affected by the fact
that the information was lawfully published on the Internet.122 The
CJEU stressed that those are two different processing operations and
114. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 77.
115. Id.
116. Id. 74. The importance of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter was already underscored
by the court in Digital Rights Ireland. See Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd., supra note 99, 37.
117. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 80.
118. Id. 81.
119. Id.
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thus each controller has to comply with its own obligations.123 It could
well be that the processing by the web publisher was lawful and
complied with the Directive, whereas the search engine's did not. For
instance, the CJEU noted that the web publisher might benefit from
the exclusions granted by national law, pursuant to Article 9 of the
Directive, for processing carried out solely for journalistic purposes,
while "that does not appear to be so" in the case of the processing by a
search engine.124 Moreover, the legitimate interests of the different
controllers-the publisher and the search engine-could lead to a
different balance regarding the legitimacy basis for the processing.
125
Finally, the CJEU tackled the question of whether the right to
erasure and the right to object could be exercised "on the ground that
that information may be prejudicial to [the data subject] or that he
wished it to be 'forgotten' after a certain time."'126 It held that in order
determine whether a data subject
has a right that the information relating to him personally should, at this point in time,
no longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made on
the basis of his name ... it is not necessary ... that the inclusion of the information in
question in the list of results causes prejudice to the data subject. 127
The CJEU went on to repeat the principles it had previously
stated-that under the Charter, the data subject does have a right
that will take priority over any other legitimate interest; the only
exception to this principle being a possible prevailing interest of the
general public in particular circumstances.28 Against that backdrop,
the CJEU held, in a situation such as the one at issue in the main
proceedings:
[Hlaving regard to the sensitivity for the data subject's private life of the information
contained in those announcements and to the fact that its initial publication had taken
place 16 years earlier, the data subject establishes a right that that information should
no longer be linked to his name by means of such a list. Accordingly, since in the case in
point there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a preponderant
interest of the public in having, in the context of such a search, access to that
information, a matter which is, however, for the referring court to establish, the data
subject may, by virtue of Article 12(b) [the right to erasure] and subparagraph (a) of the
first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 [the right to object], require those links to
be removed from the list of results. 
12 9
While the CJEU clearly stated that a prejudice to the data subject is
not required, it did not directly respond to the question of whether the
123. Id. 83.
124. Id. 85.
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rights to erasure and to object enable a data subject to require a
search engine to stop the processing merely because she wishes the
information to be consigned to oblivion. It may seem that, for the
CJEU, unless there is a prevailing interest of the general public-for
instance, because of the public relevancy of the data subject-the
question should be answered in the affirmative, owing to the
fundamental rights recognized in the Charter. Nonetheless, the
CJEU did require that the data subject's requests meet some
threshold-namely, the conditions set forth either in Article 12(b) for
the right to erasure or in Article 14(a) for the right to object.130
Therefore, it must be either that: (1) the processing fails to comply
with some of the requisites laid down in the Directive, particularly
those related to the quality of the data requiring that the data be
"adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected and/or further processed;'' 3 1 or (2) the data
subject has some "compelling legitimate grounds relating to his
particular situation" that allows him or her to object to the
processing.132
C. Follow-Up by the National Court
After receiving the judgment from the CJEU, the referring
court, the AN, resumed the proceedings and handed down its final
ruling on the case on December 29, 2014.133 Under EU law, the
national referring court applies the interpretation criteria provided by
the CJEU to the facts of the particular case. Arguably, the CJEU thus
went too far when it appraised the facts of the case and directly held
that Mr. Costeja had established a right that the information should
no longer be linked to his name by means of the search results. In any
event, the AN accepted the CJEU's assessment and further found that
Mr. Costeja had no relevant role in public life that could make the
interest of the general public prevail over his rights.
134
According to the AN, this was an initially lawful processing of
accurate personal data by Google; however, the lapse of time caused
130. See id. 88 ("[IUn so far as the conditions laid down by those provisions are in fact
satisfied"). Admittedly, this might be seen as mere lip service, as in the court's balance there was
no assessment as to whether those requirements were actually fulfilled. See also id. 82.
131. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 6(c).
132. See id. art. 14(a).
133. Audiencia Nacional, Judgment of Dec. 29, 2014, Google Spain, Google Inc., v AEDP,
ECLI:ES:AN:2014:5129], http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/indexAN.jsp [perma.cc/SV47-CJ8E]
[hereinafter AN follow-up judgment] (searching for ECLI:ES:AN:2014:5129). It must be noted
that in this ruling the name of Mr. Costeja was pseudonimized as "Humberto."
134. Id. at 27.
[Vol. 18:3:507532
2016] THE SHAKY GROUND OF THE RIGHT TO BE DELISTED
the data to become unnecessary with regard to the purposes of the
processing.13 5 Remarkably, the AN expressly held that freedom of
information was duly satisfied because the information was kept on
the source and thus still findable through searches not made on the
basis of the data subject's name.136  The AN rejected Google's
contention that the DPA decision violated its right to freedom to
conduct businesses, noting that this freedom is not an absolute right
and that, following the CJEU approach, this right was overridden by
the data subject's fundamental rights to privacy and data
protection. 137
A noteworthy aspect of the AN ruling was the holding that
Google Spain SL, the Spanish subsidiary, is also responsible for
"processing."'38 Indeed, the AN held that Google Spain SL was a data
controller itself, along with Google Inc. This responsibility stems from
the fact that both the subsidiary and its parent form a business unit,
in which the subsidiary's activity is essential to the business model of
the parent company. According to the AN, once it is established that
the Directive applies to Google Inc. precisely because the processing is
carried out in the context of the activities of Google Spain, it would
make no sense to exclude Google Spain from any liability in the
processing carried out by Google Inc. Additionally, holding otherwise
would, according to the AN, prejudice the protection the Directive
sought to ensure.
139
Finally, the AN accepted the appellants' contention that the
decision by the AEPD, the subject of the appeal, was too broad because
it ordered the search engine "to adopt the necessary measures to
remove the data from its index and prevent future access to them.'
40
According to the AN, the AEPD could only "order the search engine
operator to remove from the list of results displayed following a search
made on the basis of a person's name links to web pages published by
third parties containing information relating to that person."'
4'
Hence, the AN affirmed the AEPD decision, but remarked that it
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 21.
138. Id. at 17.
139. This ruling was appealed by Google Spain SL, particularly on account of the liability
imposed on the subsidiary, and is currently pending before the Spanish Supreme Court.
140. See AEPD Costeja, supra note 74, at 23.
141. See AN follow-up judgment, supra note 133, at 27.
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should be interpreted in this more limited sense of delisting links in
search results.
142
IV. A RIGHT ON SHAKY GROUND?
This Part discusses the legal basis of the CJEU's holdings in
Google Spain. As indicated in the previous Sections, the outcome of
the ruling was premised on construing the Data Protection Directive
provisions in light of the fundamental rights to privacy and personal
data protection enshrined in the Charter. This Part argues that: (1) in
the absence of specific safeguards, the conceptualization of search
engines as controllers, even if mandated by the Directive, is
problematic because search engines are unable to fulfill most of a
controller's legal obligations; (2) a search engine's intermediary role
should be recognized under the data protection legal framework;
(3) the specific legal basis the CJEU uses to recognize the right to be
delisted (i.e., the right to erasure and the right to object) presents
some difficulties; (4) even though it is not expressly acknowledged by
the Court, the ultimate driver of the ruling is the potential harm for
the data subject; (5) the CJEU artificially built an apparently limited
right through a creative rephrasing of the questions presented before
it; and (6) the CJEU confined its balancing exercise to the criteria laid
down in the Directive, disregarding the assessment of competing
rights required by the Charter.
A. Search Engines as Data Controllers
Generalist search engines carry out two different types of
activities that must be distinguished. On the one hand, they provide
search services-they crawl the Internet to index publicly available
information and respond to users' search queries by displaying links to
the most relevant content and perform the intermediary function of
locating information on the Internet.143 The generalist search engines
142. Nonetheless, the ruling said nothing about whether the delisting of the links must
be done in all Google domains, including Google.com, or just in the European country-code
top-level domains, such as Google.es or Google.fr.
143. This is not to say that search engines offer necessarily a purely neutral and
objective view of the relevant information. That is, nonetheless, a different debate. Some authors
claim search engines hould avoid bias and act as mere conduits of the information available
online. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 115 (2006). Others put forward that search engines are, in fact, editors and thus free to
choose the results as they see fit, exercising their freedom of speech. See, e.g., Eric Goldman,
Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188
(2006); Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine
Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POLY 883 (2012). Departing from both the conduit theory and the
editor theory, a third view has been offered by James Grimmelmann considering search engines
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allow their users to find content online, staying between the content
providers and the users who seek information. The Internet would
hardly work without information location tools such as those provided
by search engines-the information would be on the Internet but
impossible for most users to find.144 On the other hand, search
engines, in a related but clearly different function, establish a
relationship with their users and collect personal information about
them, which allows them to track both users' search query histories
and their surfing behaviors by following them across different services
and platforms. A search engine may process that information to
profile users to show them targeted advertising as well as to provide
them with more personalized search results. With regard to the
processing of users' data, search engines squarely fall within the
notion of controller.1
45
However, a completely different situation emerges with regard
to third-party personal data that happen to be included in the content
that search engines index and make available to users (content data).
As the AG noted,146 the search engine is generally not aware of the
nature of the indexed content and does not treat it as personal data.147
Furthermore, its activity simply does not comport with the role of a
controller envisioned by the Data Protection Directive.148
While the Directive offers an apparently clear definition of a
controller: the one who "alone or jointly with others determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data," its application
as trusted users' advisors. See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868
(2014).
144. In this regard, the WP29 has noted that "[s]earch engines play a crucial role as a
first point of contact to access information freely on the internet. Such free access to information
is essential to build one's personal opinion in our democracy." See WP29 Opinion on Search
Engines, supra note 84, at 8.
145. See id. at 9.
146. See AG Opinion, supra note 101, 82.
147. Admittedly, in some cases, search engines do provide some added value that
arguably entails knowingly treating personal data as such. For instance, for some entities and
persons, Google displays a box where it highlights some relevant data which may include the day
of birth, name of the spouse, name of the children, and so on. Of course, this is only likely to
occur with public figures or other people frequently searched for by users. See Google Official
Blog, Introducing the Knowledge Graph: Things, Not Strings (May 16, 2012),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com.es/2012/05/introducing-knowledge-graph-things-not.html
[perma.ccH4TC-BRNX]; see also Christopher Null, Google, Why Won't You Let Me Forget My
Divorce? WIRED (May 7, 2015), http://www.wired.com12015/05/google-wont-let-forget-divorce/
[perma.cc/4345-CEXTI. While it ultimately relies on gathering information publicly available on
the Internet, this type of processing appears, indeed, to be more problematic from a data
protection point of view. See also WP29 Opinion on Search Engines, supra note 84, at 15.
148. See AG Opinion, supra note 101, 90; see also AN Reference Google Spain, supra
note 67, at 11.
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to specific cases is far from straightforward.149 In particular, the
participation of multiple actors in a processing operation or in a
number of related processing operations makes it difficult to
determine if all of them should be considered controllers and, if so,
how the responsibilities should be allocated among them.
150
In a typical right-to-be-delisted scenario, at least two different
entities process the relevant personal data. First, there is the
information content provider that publishes the information including
the personal data on a webpage. Second, there is the search engine
that indexes that content and displays a link to it when a user types
the data subject's name into the search box. Both processing
operations, that of the publisher and that of the search engine, are
obviously related not only because the latter constitutes a further
processing of the data already processed by the publisher, but also
because the publisher will generally be aware that the information
will be indexed and findable through search engines. In fact, the
publisher will be able in many cases to prevent search engines from
indexing its content by using the "robots.txt" protocol or other
technical means.151 Should those two activities be considered a "set of
operations" where both the publisher and the search engine pursue a
jointly determined purpose, which would make them joint
controllers?
52
In a 2008 opinion dealing specifically with search engines, the
advisory body WP29 noted that "[tihe principle of proportionality
requires that to the extent that a search engine provider acts purely
as an intermediary, it should not be considered to be the principal
149. The complexities of the issue are well illustrated in the Article 29 Working Party
Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of "controller" and "processor" (264/10/EN) WP 169, Feb. 16, 2010
[hereinafter WP29 Opinion on the concepts of "controller" and "processor"].
150. As the WP29 noted, "[1]n the context of joint control the participation of the parties
to the joint determination may take different forms and does not need to be equally shared." See
id. at 19. These parties "may have a very close relationship (sharing, for example, all purposes
and means of a processing) or a more loose relationship (for example, sharing only purposes or
means, or a part thereof)." See id. In this regard, the WP29 Opinion put forward that "a broad
variety of typologies for joint control should be considered and their legal consequences assessed,
allowing some flexibility in order to cater for the increasing complexity of current data processing
reality." See id. In addition, the WP29 noted:
[T]he mere fact that different subjects cooperate in processing personal data, for
example in a chain, does not entail that they are joint controllers in all cases, since an
exchange of data between two parties without sharing purposes or means in a
common set of operations should be considered only as a transfer of data between
separate controllers.
Id.
151. For more information on the "robots.txt" exclusion protocol and html tags, see
http://www.robotstxt.org/ /perma.ccJY6NN-MKQC].
152. See WP29 Opinion on the concepts of "controller" and "processor," supra note 149, at
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controller with regard to the content related processing of personal
data that is taking place."'
153
Rather, the WP29 held that the principal controllers of
personal data in this case are the information providers. This
conclusion seems to assume that both the publisher and the search
engine are joint controllers, although the responsibilities are
distributed asymmetrically among them.154  The WP29 chose to
understand that a search engine will only be responsible for what falls
under its control, pointing out that "[t]he formal, legal and practical
control the search engine has over the personal data involved is
usually limited to the possibility of removing data from its servers."'
55
This reasoning led the WP29 to assert that "[w]ith regard to the
removal of personal data from their index and search results, search
engines have sufficient control to consider them as controllers (either
alone or jointly with others) in those cases."'56 Apparently, the search
engine's obligations as controllers thus would be limited to that
removal. Remarkably, nonetheless, the WP29 further noted that "the
extent to which an obligation to remove or block personal data exists,
may depend on the general tort law and liability regulations of the
particular Member State."'57  Hence, the WP29 apparently assumed
that even though search engines are to be considered controllers with
153. See WP29 Opinion on Search Engines, supra note 84, at 14 (emphasis added).
"Principal controller" is not a notion defined in the Directive. Id.
154. In contrast, where a search engine actively searches for personal data as such and
provides added value services based on those data, or where it sells advertisements triggered by
the data, the search engine is not acting as a pure intermediary, according to the WP29. In those
cases, "the search engine provider is fully responsible under data protection laws for the
resulting content related to the processing of personal data." Id. Likewise, the WP29 considered
that search engines go beyond their intermediary role when they cache contents for a longer
period than is strictly necessary to address the problem of the temporary inaccessibility of the
origin page. In this situation, the WP29 deemed the search engines "responsible for compliance
with data protection laws, in their role as controllers of the personal data contained in the cached
publications." Id. at 15.
155. See WP29 Opinion on Search Engines, supra note 84, at 14.
156. Id. This approach is arguably at odds with what the WP29 had determined in a
previous opinion, holding:
[E]specially in cases of joint control, not being able to directly fulfill all controller's
obligations (ensuring information, right of access, etc) does not exclude being a
controller. It may be that in practice those obligations could easily be fulfilled by other
parties, which are sometimes closer to the data subject, on the controller's behalf.
However, a controller will remain in any case ultimately responsible for its obligations
and liable for any breach to them.
See WP29 Opinion on the concepts of "controller" and "processor", supra note 149, at 22.
157. See WP29 Opinion on Search Engines, supra note 84, at 14. Indeed, the Conclusions
part of the opinion does not include any such obligation to remove and refers only the situation
where the search engine is considered a principal controller with regards to its cache. See id. at
25.
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regard to those removals, their role as intermediaries might relieve
them from such an obligation.
If the analysis by the WP29 was driven by the principle of
proportionality, the same principle led the AG to reach a different
conclusion: that, except in special circumstances, a search engine is
not a controller. In the AG's view, one can only be considered a
controller if one "is aware of the existence of a certain defined category
of information amounting to personal data and the controller
processes this data with some intention which relates to their
processing as personal data,"158 which would not be the case with a
search engine.
159
Against this backdrop, the conclusion by the CJEU that Google
is indeed a controller is not that surprising. Although this
interpretation has been criticized in the literature as a departure from
the more careful approach taken by the WP29,16° this advisory body
had, in fact, also concluded that a search engine is a controller, albeit
not the principal one and with only limited obligations, because even
the removal of the data from its index and search results might
depend on national tort law. However, there is a considerable
difference-the CJEU treats the search engine as a separate controller
whose processing is different from, and additional to, that of the
publishers,1 61 which makes the search engine fully responsible for that
processing, at least in theory.
It must be stressed that, according to the CJEU, the search
engine is a data controller not only of the data displayed on the search
results-the text of the link and the snippet below it-but also of the
content data-the data included in the linked-to webpages. Indeed,
the court held:
[Flirst, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or
placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily
and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of
preference must be classified as 'processing of personal data' within the meaning of
Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of
158. See AG Opinion, supra note 101, 82 (emphasis in the original).
159. The AG concluded that a search engine could only be considered a controller when it
had not complied with the instructions set out in the publisher's page establishing that the
search engine's robots hould not crawl or cache the page, or requiring specific conditions for the
updating of the information cached by the search engine, a situation which was not the case in
the proceedings that led to the reference for a preliminary ruling in Google Spain. See AG
Opinion, supra note 101, 99. Arguably, however, considering the search engine a controller in
those cases is at odds with the AG's own notion of controller requiring specific awareness by the
controller that it is processing personal data as such.
160. See for instance Giovanni Sartor, Search Engines as Controllers: Inconvenient
Implications of a Questionable Classification, 21 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. AND COMP. L. 564
(2014).
161. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 35.
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the search engine must be regarded as the 'controller' in respect of that processing,
within the meaning of Article 2(d).
162
Thus, the question is not only about the text displayed on the
results screen, but also about the information to which the search
results link. Indeed, the court stated that "the supervisory authority
or judicial authority may order the operator of the search engine to
remove from the list of results displayed following a search made on
the basis of a person's name links to web pages published by third
parties containing information relating to that person.'6 3
However, characterizing a search engine as a controller of all
personal data included in indexed web pages is arguably a
far-reaching result. As noted, there is an initial problem-whether a
search engine actually meets the definition of a controller when it is
not specifically aware that the data it is processing are personal
data.164 But even if this question is answered in the affirmative,
another question arises as to whether this characterization can be
seen as a proportionate outcome in view of the legal duties the
Directive attaches to controllers. As already noted earlier, they are
unable to comply with most of the obligations the Directive imposes on
data controllers.165 In particular, indexing any information published
on public websites that happen to include sensitive categories of data
(i.e., data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious
or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, or concerning health
or sex life) would be unlawful, as the controller's legitimate interests
are not a valid exception against the general prohibition of processing
this type of data set forth in Article 8 of the Directive. Search engines
would thus be subject to civil, administrative, and even criminal
liability for unlawful processing.166  Ultimately, search engines'
activity would simply be incompatible with EU law. 167
162. Id. 41 (emphasis added).
163. Id. 82 (emphasis added).
164. This objection, already raised by the AG, has been stressed by some commentators.
See, Sartor, supra note 160 (pointing out that the CJEU's conclusion is based on the underlying
assumption that "a search engine chooses to process personal data whenever it knows that
among the data it processes there are personal data, even though it does not know and does not
care which they are," and that such an assumption "is premised on a questionable understanding
of the role of services on the internet, such as those performed by a search engine," where in fact
the users who upload the content are those who choose to have that content indexed by search
engines).
165. See, e.g., controllers' obligations established in Article 6 of the Directive, regarding
the "data quality" principles.
166. See Sartor, supra note 160.
167. AG Opinion, supra note 101, 90. This incompatibility had already been noted by
the AN. See AN Reference Google Spain, supra note 67, at 11; see also Joris van Hoboken, Case
note, CJEU 13 May 2014, C-131/12 (Google Spain) (2014), http://ssrn.comabstract=2495580
[perma.cc/DG5K-CZPF], 9 ("Since the conclusion that all sensitive data would have to be
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Maybe in an effort to mitigate the consequences of categorizing
search engine as controllers, the CJEU appears to limit the
obligations of a search engine as a controller by holding that it "must
ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and
capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of [the]
Directive. ' 168 However, such a holding hardly comports with the
language of the Directive. While the Directive does exempt controllers
from fulfilling some obligations that would require disproportionate
efforts, it does so only in particular areas, such as regarding the duty
to inform data subjects and the need to notify third parties.169
The CJEU apparently faced a difficult choice: either to consider
the search engine a controller, which would enable the data subject to
exercise her rights before the search engine, or to conclude that the
search engine was not a controller, thereby leaving the data subject
unprotected.170 For some authors, though, this dichotomy could have
been avoided by considering search engines as controllers but then
applying to them the so-called media exception-a possibility ruled
out by the CJEU.171 Other commentators asserted that the court
should not have considered them controllers; instead, the interests of
both search engines and data subjects could be satisfactorily handled
by resorting to the specific legal regime for intermediaries set out in
another statute, the E-Commerce Directive,172  which will be
considered below in subsection IV.B.1.
purged from search engines i  as unworkable as undesirable, some exceptions derogations should
clearly apply.").
168. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/jurisfliste.jsfnum=C-131/12 [https://perma.cc/8V2T-
CLRR], 38 (emphasis added).
169. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 11(2) (exempting the controller
from the obligation to provide some information to the data subject when "the provision of such
information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort"); see also id. art. 12(c)
(providing that the controller must notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of
any rectification, erasure, or blocking carried out after a request by the data subject, unless this
proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort).
170. The CJEU noted, in fact, that concluding that the search engine is not a controller
"would be contrary not only to the clear wording of [the definition of controller] but also to its
objective-which is to ensure, through a broad definition of the concept of 'controller,' effective
and complete protection of data subjects." See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 34.
171. See Hoboken, supra note 167, 7 (noting that "[t]he only way out of far-reaching
obligations after this conclusion [that search engines are controllers] would have been an
acknowledgement of the relevance of Article 9 Directive 95/46/EC, the so-called media
exemption").
172. See Sartor, supra note 160; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce) 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1, arts. 12-15 (establishing exemptions from liability or "safe harbors" for third-party
content) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
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In sum, the right to be delisted recognized by the CJEU ruling
is arguably based on shaky ground, as it is ultimately premised on the
search engine characterization as a data controller of content data in
spite of the fact that a search engine's activity regarding such data can
hardly be reconciled with the obligations controllers face under the
Directive. Thus, the CJEU failed to properly take into account the
intermediary role played by generalist search engines in the digital
information environment. However, the one to blame in this respect is
more the legislator than the court, as the Directive itself does not
appear to allow the recognition of such a role.173  If the
characterization of search engines as controllers is mandated by the
EU data protection law, then there is arguably a problem with the
law. Such a result is not uncommon in the sweeping data protection
legal regime, whose broad approach that aims to afford data subjects
the maximum level of protection may actually lead to inconsistent
outcomes.
Data protection law should specifically protect search engines'
intermediary role. This would not be incompatible with the
establishment of some obligation to delist links in specific cases, but
such an obligation should not be based on a categorization of search
engines as controllers, because that classification entails a set of
duties that, even if never enforced, are at odds with their intermediary
nature.
Search engines' intermediary role as information locators
raises the questions of how they should be treated in terms of liability
and how data protection law should acknowledge and adapt to such a
role. Those questions will be briefly considered in the following
Section.
B. Protecting Search Engines' Intermediary Role
1. Intermediary Liability Safe Harbors
EU law has established safe harbors exempting certain types of
intermediary services from liability so that, as long as they meet some
conditions, they cannot be held liable for the unlawful content
provided by their users. This safe harbor scheme was set forth in
Articles 12 through 15 of the 2000 E-Commerce Directive,174 a set of
rules that was inspired, to a large extent, by the 1998 US Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 175  Both statutes present,
173. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23.
174. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 172, arts. 12-15.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2012) (establishing limitations for service provider liability).
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nonetheless, significant differences, such as how the DMCA deals
exclusively with infringements of copyright, and the E-Commerce
Directive's safe harbors apply horizontally to any kind of unlawful
content. 
176
Another key difference is that, unlike the DMCA, 177 the
E-Commerce Directive does not provide for a specific safe harbor for
information location tools-it only establishes exemptions for mere
conduit, proxy caching, and hosting of third-party contents. Some
Member States, however, did introduce an information location tool
safe harbor when implementing that Directive into national law.178 In
addition, some national courts have wrangled with the absence of such
a safe harbor, eventually concluding that the hosting exemption might
be enough to cover the operation of a search engine.
179
But even if the hosting safe harbor is to be considered broad
enough to accommodate search engines' activity, the applicability of
the safe harbors to situations where the third-party content may
violate data protection rights remains unclear. This situation arises
because, in spite of the horizontal approach of the E-Commerce
Directive, Article 1(5)(b) of this Directive excludes from the Directive's
scope "questions relating to information society services covered by
176. For a comparison of both statutes, see Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors
and Their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2012) (establishing liability limitations for information location
tools).
178. See, e.g., the Spanish Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce Law,
B.O.E. n. 166, Jul. 12, 2002, http:/www.boe.eslbuscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2002-13758
[perma.cc/C8WP-SZLY], art. 17 (providing for a liability safe harbor for search engines and
information location tools). The Spanish Supreme Court applied this provision to find Google not
liable for displaying links to third-party information that turned out to be defamatory. See
Palomo v Google Inc., Tribunal Supremo, Sala Civil, Judgment 144/2013 of Mar. 4, 2013
(ECLI:ES:TS:2013:2245). In another case, regarding a 'right-to-be-delisted' claim, it was
considered that Google did not meet the safe harbor conditions and was sentenced to pay
damages for not removing the links. See Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, Secc. 16, Judgment
364/2014 of Jul. 17, 2014 (ECLI:ES:APB:2014:8246). Both rulings are available at
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/indexAN.jsp [perma.cc/3G7J-JABX], by searching the ECLI
number (European Case Law Identifier).
179. See e.g., Saif v. Google, Cour d'Appel de Paris, P6le 5, Chambre 1, Judgment of Jan.
26 2011, http://juriscom.net/wp-content/documents/caparis20110l26.pdf [perma.cc/68BE-QXAF]
(holding that Google's image search engine is a neutral intermediary that may benefit from the
liability exemptions). See also the German Supreme Court's Vorschaubilder case, BGH, I ZR
69/08, Apr. 29, 2010, 39, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/
document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2010&Sort=3&nr=51777&pos=l&anz=94
[perma.ccIXZ3D-NRUZ] (stating, though only in dicta, that Google Images would benefit from
the hosting safe harbor). In some cases, even in the absence of any applicable safe harbor, courts
have decided there was no sufficient basis as to hold the search engine liable for the content it
linked to. See Metropolitan Int'l Schools Ltd. v. Designtechnica Corp., [2011] 1 WLR 1743, [2009]
EWHC 1765 (Q.B.) (holding Google Inc. not liable for an allegedly defamatory snippet displayed
in search results, as the defendant could not be characterized as a publisher under common law).
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[Data Protection Directives]."'' 80 The interpretation of this provision is
not straightforward, though. Concluding that a service provider may
rely on the safe harbors for any possible kind of unlawful third-party
content except where the content happens to include personal data
would run afoul of the rationale behind the Directive's horizontal
approach-that an intermediary would carry out the same technical
activity regardless of the kind of content involved-and thus the rules
should also be the same.181 Excluding personal data from the safe
harbors' protection would also go against the principle established in
Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive that Member States cannot
impose a general obligation on intermediaries "to monitor the
information which they transmit or store" or "a general obligation
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity."
182
Therefore, a reading of Article 1(5)(b) more consistent with the rest of
the Directive might conclude that it does not intend to limit the scope
of the safe harbors when it comes to content including personal
data.18
3
Apparently recognizing the need to keep the safe harbors
available in data protection issues, the General Data Protection
Regulation expressly declares that the GDRP will be "without
prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of
the liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15
180. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 172, art. 1(5)(b). In the same vein, Recital 14
to the E-Commerce Directive, notes that Directives on Data Protection "already establish a
Community legal framework in the field of personal data and therefore it is not necessary to
cover this issue in this Directive in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal
market, in particular the free movement of personal data between Member States." It further
states that "the implementation and application of this Directive should be made in full
compliance with the principles relating to the protection of personal data, in particular as
regards unsolicited commercial communication and the liability of intermediaries." Id.
181. See Commission First Report on the application of Directive 2000/311EC, at 12,
COM (2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003) ('The limitations on liability provided for by the Directive
are established in a horizontal manner, meaning that they cover liability, both civil and criminal,
for all types of illegal activities initiated by third parties.").
182. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 172, art. 15(1). For a provision parallel to
that, see § 512(m) of the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2012).
183. In the Vividown case, the Italian Supreme Court held that Article 1(5)(b)
E-Commerce Directive does not in itself render the safe harbors inoperative when it comes to
data protection; rather, it is merely meant to make it clear that the data protection framework
remains applicable to online activities. See Corte di Cassazione, sez. III Penale, judgment n.
5107, Dec 17, 2013-Feb. 3, 2014 (Vividown), http://www.dirittoegiustizia.it/
allegati/15/0000063913/Corte diCassazione sezIII Penale sentenza n 5107_14_depositata il_
3_febbraio.html [perma.cc/3V2R-MD42]. Along the same lines, see Sartor, supra note 160, at 574
("[This provision can be understood as only meaning that the obligations concerning data
protection remain only those established by the Data Protection Directive, a statement that is
fully compatible with the immunity of intermediaries for third parties' violations of such
obligations.").
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of that Directive."'1 4  However, this may not be enough to protect
search engines from liability. First, it is not clear whether the search
activity is covered by the E-Commerce safe harbors in the first
place.8 5 Second, even if linking is covered by the safe harbors,
characterizing search engines as controllers might imply that they are
not neutral and passive enough to be eligible for the safe harbors'
protection. 186
Greater legal certainty would be desirable in this regard, which
could perhaps be achieved through an amendment of the E-Commerce
Directive to include a safe harbor for information location tools. Such
a safe harbor should expressly exempt from liability not just the
conduct consisting of locating potentially unlawful third-party content
on the Internet, but also-if they are to be considered controllers-the
processing activity carried out by search engines.
2. Intermediaries Under the Data Protection Legal Framework
The Data Protection Directive does not specifically leave out
search engines from the notion of what a controller is. However, it
does so with another kind of Internet intermediaries-Internet service
providers (ISPs) that provide transmission services. The Directive
makes it clear that when ISPs transmit messages containing personal
data, "the controller in respect of the personal data contained in the
message will normally be considered to be the person from whom the
message originates, rather than the person offering the transmission
services.'' 8 7 This exclusion of transmission service providers from the
"controller" categorization appears to rest on the ISP's purely
intermediary role as a passive conduit. In spite of all the differences
184. See GDPR final draft, supra note 7, Art. 2(3) and Recital 17.
185. By way of comparison, search engines' protection from liability for third-party
content is much stronger under US law. First, when it comes to copyright infringing content, a
search engine would find a shelter under the DMCA. Second, and more generally, a search
engine will be protected from most liability claims under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA). See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see, e.g., Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931,
(C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), aff'd No. 12-2810 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the claims of invasion of
privacy and defamation against defendant search engines were barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230).
186. See CJEU, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL, Google Inc. v
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA et al. (March 23, 2010), 114 (holding that to be eligible for the
hosting safe harbor, the role played by the intermediary must be "neutral, in the sense that its
conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of
the data which it stores").
187. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, Recital 47 ("[W]here a message
containing personal data is transmitted by means of a telecommunications or electronic mail
service, the sole purpose of which is the transmission of such messages, the controller in respect
of the personal data contained in the message will normally be considered to be the person from
whom the message originates, rather than the person offering the transmission services."); see
also AG Opinion, supra note 101, 87.
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between the relevant Internet intermediaries, a similar rationale
could arguably be used for search engines: they serve the intermediary
function of finding information available online without any
intervention as to the creation of the content they allow users to
locate. The Directive, nonetheless, remains silent about search
engines, and the Google Spain court found them to be controllers of
the data included in the searched-for content.
1 88
The legal framework surrounding data protection should evolve
to appropriately accommodate general search engines. This might be
done by crafting specific provisions for search engines so that, while
being subject to specific reasonable obligations, they are otherwise
allowed to provide search services without violating the law. Those
obligations might include specific duties with regard to the harm data
subjects may experience as a consequence of the widespread
dissemination of search results that point to information that includes
an individual's personal data, particularly after a search made on the
basis of his or her name. However, such a redress should be
addressed in a way that avoids the problems detected in Google Spain,
especially with regard to the appropriate balance of competing rights
and interests, to overcome that decision's shortcomings and wide
range of potentially unintended consequences.
C. The Legal Basis for Having the Links Delisted
1. Overlapping Rights
The CJEU found that Mr. Costeja established a right that the
information he complained of should no longer be linked to his name
by means of the search results list,189 but it did not determine which
precise legal basis under the Data Protection Directive would allow
him to require such delisting-i.e., the right to erasure in Article 12(b)
or the right to object in Article 14(a). Indeed, the CJEU held that in a
case such as the one brought before it, the data subject could "require
those links to be removed from the list of results" by virtue of both the
right to erasure and the right to object.19°
188. See Joris van Hoboken, The Proposed Right to be Forgotten Seen from the
Perspective of Our Right to Remember. Freedom of Expression Safeguards in a Converging
Information Environment (2013), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload-documents/
VanHobokenRightTo%20Be%2OForgotten Manuscript_2013.pdf [perma.cc/545V-ZNMA]
(suggesting that data protection law distinguishes "between the processing of personal data in
the relation between users and the service (user data) and the processing of data on or through
the service (content data)" and noting that "the first type of relation seems more suitable to be
structured through the application of data protection rules and principles").
189. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 98.
190. Id.
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In principle though, those rights are mutually exclusive. The
former right covers data processing that does not fulfill, or no longer
fulfills, the Directive provisions and is thus unlawful. 91 The latter
right concerns situations of lawful processing, to which the data
subject is, nonetheless, allowed to object on account of "compelling
legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation."192 Therefore,
either one right or the other-or none-should apply in a specific case.
The CJEU, however, conflated both rights in its judgment, maybe to
cover other cases with slightly different circumstances. But since the
CJEU held that Mr. Costeja "establishe[d]" a right to have the links
delisted, it should have been able to discern which was the specific
right applicable in that particular case.
Arguably, however, the matter is not that obvious. The right of
erasure and the right to object actually overlap significantly, and they
are, in a way, caught in a circular rationale. Indeed, when a data
subject has compelling grounds to object under Article 14(a) of the
Data Protection Directive to an otherwise lawful processing, the
conclusion should probably be reached that under Article 7(f); "the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or
parties to whom the data are disclosed" are in fact "overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject,"
and thus that the controller lacks legitimate grounds for the
processing under Article 7(o.193 In turn, the lack of a such
grounds-the consent of the individual being absent-would make the
processing non-compliant with the Directive provisions, allowing the
data subject to exercise the right to erasure under Article 12(b). In a
similar vein, if the data subject has "compelling legitimate grounds"
relating to her particular situation to object to the processing under
Article 14(a), this might indicate that the data are in fact inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing.
This situation would then entail lack of compliance with Article 6(1)(c)
and, again, would allow the data subject to exercise the right to
erasure under Article 12(b).
191. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 12(b).
192. Id. art. 14(a).
193. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 7(f); see also Herke Kranenborg,
Case Note: Google and the Right to be Forgotten, 1 EuR. DATA PROTECTION L. (2015) (noting that
the CJEU apparently absorbed the criterion of having "compelling grounds" to object in the
balance of interests required in Article 7(), and that "[ilt thereby relinquishe[d] the opportunity
to use the criterion provided in Article 14 to give a bit more weight to the right of freedom of
expression and avoid criticism on the lack of a proper balance between the conflicting rights at
stake").
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2. Is it the Search Engine's or the Publisher's Processing?
The CJEU found that the individual has the right to have the
links delisted when the data are "inadequate, irrelevant or no longer
relevant, or excessive."1 94 Those adjectives have prompted criticism
against what has been considered too vague a standard, unable to
meet any reasonable threshold for suppressing speech on the
Internet.195 Whatever the merits of these critiques, it must be noted
that those words are actually taken from Article 6(1)(c) of the
Directive.196 Those words do not refer to the fact that the individual
may simply consider the data to be inadequate, irrelevant, or
excessive in general or according to his or her preferences. Rather, the
inadequateness, irrelevancy, or excessiveness is to be assessed, as the
CJEU notes, "in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue
carried out by the operator of the search engine."
197
This legal standard, set forth in the Directive, is thus meant to
be an objective one, rather than subjective. The question is then what
are the "purposes" of the processing carried out by the search engine.
While these purposes were not made explicit in the judgment, it may
be safe to assume that they consist of making easily findable
information publicly available on the Internet by displaying results
relevant to users' search queries.1 98 If this is so, an argument could be
made that displaying links to information that is publicly available on
the Internet and relates to the name which has been used as a search
term is consistent with the purposes of the processing carried out by
the search engine-it is not inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive with
regard to those purposes.199
In particular, the mere fact that the information was originally
published many years ago does not seem to contradict the search
engine's purpose of making the information that currently exists on
194. See Google Spain, Case C- 131/12, 94.
195. See, e.g., Andrew McLaughlin's opening statement at the Intelligence Squared US
debate, supra, note 1; see also Washington Post's Editorial Board, UnGoogled: The Disastrous
Results of the 'Right to be Forgotten'Ruling, WASH. POST (July 12, 2014).
196. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 6(1)(c) ("[Plersonal data must be
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and/or further processed.").
197. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 1 94 (emphasis added).
198. See Grimmelmann, supra note 143 (proposing a normative framework to deal with
the provision of search engines' results premised on the idea that search engines should not be
treated neither as passive conduits nor as active editors, but as trusted users' advisors).
199. See Anna Bunn, The Curious Case of the Right to be Forgotten, 31 COMPUTER L. &
SECuRITY REV., 336, 342-43 (2015) (correctly observing that "the Court made no findings that
the personal data relating to Mr [Costeja] in the search results were unnecessary or inadequate
or were irrelevant, excessive or inaccurate in light of the purposes for which that data was
collected or processed by Google").
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the Internet available through search results.200 Instead, it could be
argued that in such a case, the data may be inadequate, irrelevant, or
excessive with regard to the purposes of processing carried out by the
publisher, rather than regarding the purposes of the search engine's
processing.201 But then the one failing to comply with the data quality
principle would be the publisher, not the search engine, and the
condition for requesting the delisting under the right to erasure would
not be fulfilled. Indeed, the CJEU conditioned the delisting requests
under the right to erasure to the fact that the "information appears,
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to be inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the
purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the
search engine.
' '20 2
In any event, this Article submits that what is ultimately
determinative for the CJEU's recognition of a right to be delisted is
not the fact that the data may be inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive
for the purposes of the processing, as required by the Directive-in
this case the search engine's processing-but that such processing
may have a potentially excessive or disproportionate impact on the
individual because of the wide availability and diffusion of search
engines and the possibility to obtain a detailed profile of the data
subject.20 3 Likewise, the CJEU's decision to focus only on the scenario
where the search is made on the basis of the data subject's name and
200. Id. at 343; see also the AG Opinion, supra note 101, 1 98 ("Inasmuch as the link is
adequate in the sense that the data corresponding to the search term really appears or has
appeared on the linked web pages, the index in my opinion complies with the criteria of
adequacy, relevancy, proportionality, accuracy and completeness, set out in Articles 6(c) and 6(d)
of the Directive.").
201. The Guidelines published by the WP29 on the application of Google Spain reflect
this paradox. When considering whether the data are up-to-date or being made available for
longer than is necessary for the purpose of the processing, the document states that "[a]s a
general rule, DPAs will approach this factor with the objective of ensuring that information that
is not reasonably current and that has become inaccurate because it is out-of-date is forgotten.
Such an assessment will be dependent on the purpose of the original processing." See Art. 29
Working Party, Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union
judgment on "Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD) and
Mario Costeja Gonzlez" C-131/12 (14/EN) WP 225, Nov. 26, 2014 [hereinafter WP29
Guidelines], at 19 (emphasis added).
202. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 94 (emphasis added).
203. The WP29 Guidelines note that "[e]ven when (continued) publication by the original
publishers is lawful, the universal diffusion and accessibility of that information by a search
engine, together with other data related to the same individual, can be unlawful due to the
disproportionate impact on privacy." See WP29 Guidelines, supra note 201, 7 (emphasis added).
In the same vein, the WAP29 notes that internal search engines on websites do not provide a
complete profile of the data subject, and "the results will not have a serious impact on him,"
which leads the VP29 to conclude that "as a rule the right to delisting should not apply to search
engines with a restricted field of action, particularly in the case of search tools of websites of
newspapers." See id. 19.
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requiring only the delisting of the results-a move that will be
examined in the next subsection-appears to respond to the same
idea. Should the real concern be that the data are inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive for the purposes of the search engine's
processing, the CJEU arguably could have also required the complete
deletion of the data from the search engine's index; however, it did
not. The element of potential serious interference-that would only
accrue where the search is made on the individual's name and would
only need delisting to be avoided-appears thus to be the underlying
driver for the CJEU's holding,20 4 even though the CJEU held that
prejudice to the data subject is not required.
20 5
3. A Creative Surgical Approach Taken by the CJEU
As noted earlier, the CJEU confined the discussion to searches
made by the name of individuals and asserted only a right to delist the
link-as opposed to a right to remove the information from the search
engine's index altogether. This surgical approach was a creative move
by the CJEU. When discussing the extent of the obligations of a
search engine with regard to the right of erasure and the right to
object, the CJEU quietly rephrased the wording of the questions
referred by the national court, the AN. Such rephrasing allowed the
CJEU to sidestep the question of whether a data subject has a right to
have the data removed from the search engine's index and to affirm
instead a more narrowly-tailored right-the right that some links are
not displayed on the list of results when a search is carried out on the
basis of the data subject's name.
In fact, the AN had posed to the CJEU the question of whether,
to protect the data subject's rights to erasure and to objection, the data
protection authority could "directly impose on [Google] a requirement
that it withdraw from its indexes an item of information published by
third parties, without addressing itself in advance or simultaneously
to the owner of the web page on which that information is located."206
204. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 81; see also David Lindsay, The 'Right to be
Forgotten' by Search Engines under Data Privacy Law: A Legal Analysis of the Costeja Ruling, 6
J. OF MEDIA L. 159, 178 (2014) ("[The CJEU's analysis was particularly influenced by the extent
to which it considered the enhanced accessibility of personal data enabled by search engines to
be privacy-intrusive.").
205. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 96. The "potential serious interference" could
perhaps be better related to the general requirement in Article 6(1)(a) that the data must be
processed "fairly." It might also count as an element to override the 'legitimate interest" as a
basis for the processing under Article 7(0, or as "compelling grounds" on which to object to the
processing under Article 14(a).
206. Id. 20, Question 2(c) (emphasis added); see also AN Reference Google Spain, supra
note 67, at 17.
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In the event that the answer to that question was affirmative, the AN
asked whether "the obligation of search engines to protect those rights
[would] be excluded when the information that contains the personal
data has been lawfully published by third parties and is kept on the
web page from which it originates.'" 20 7 Purporting to report those
questions, the CJEU actually rephrased them by stating:
[The referring court asks, in essence, whether [to comply with the right to erasure and
the right to object] the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person's name links to web
pages, published by third parties and containing information relating to that person,
also in a case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or
simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its
publication in itself on those pages is lawful.
2 08
By rephrasing the questions actually posed by the AN in this
way, the CJEU was, in fact, determining beforehand-without a
proper discussion-the boundaries of the right it was prepared to
recognize. The CJEU answered that self-posed question in the
affirmative, thus asserting that in order to comply with the data
subject's rights, a search engine must remove the relevant links from
a list of results produced by a search for the data subject's
name-something notably different than removing the information
from its index altogether, which was what the AN had asked the
CJEU to determine. Whether or not a data subject might also ask for
a complete removal from the search engine's index remained
unanswered by the CJEU. The discussion in the judgment did not
provide any justification for this surgical approach to the problem.
When the court addressed the question of whether the
information must be prejudicial to the data subject, it again
reformulated the original referred question into a more surgical one.
The AN had posed the question of whether the data subject may
request search engines "to prevent indexing of the information
relating to him personally, published on third parties' web pages.
20 9
The CJEU changed that wording, as if the AN had asked whether the
data subject has "a right that the information relating to him
personally should, at this point in time, no longer be linked to his
name by a list of results displayed following a search made on the
basis of his name.' 210 This alteration again allowed the court to
acknowledge a narrowly tailored right.
207. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 20, Question 2(c).
208. Id. 62.
209. Id. 20 (Question 3) (emphasis added); see also AN Reference Google Spain, supra
note 67, at 17.
210. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 89.
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D. The Balancing of Rights
The right to data protection does not exist in a vacuum; rather,
it coexists with other rights that must be adequately considered in a
careful balancing. This balancing of rights must be done both "inside"
and "outside" the data protection legal framework. On the one hand,
the Data Protection Directive already contains some provisions that
require a balancing of rights to be carried out and provides for some
exceptions and derogations aimed at reconciling data protection with
other rights mentioned in the Directive. Nonetheless, those are not
the only provisions that must be taken into account before asserting a
data subject's right that may interfere with other fundamental rights
recognized in the Charter, such as the freedom of expression and
information (Article 11) and the freedom to conduct business (Article
16). Specific criteria for determining whether a limitation to the
rights provided by the Charter is acceptable are established in Article
52.211 In addition, this provision expressly provides that insofar as the
Charter contains rights that correspond to rights guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), they will have the
same meaning and scope as those in the ECHR.212
The way the CJEU approached the balancing of rights has
been the focus of much of the criticism against the Google Spain
judgment.213 Indeed, a number of shortcomings may be identified in
how the court tackled the question. On the one hand, the CJEU only
considered the rules contained in the Data Protection Directive,
particularly that of Article 7(f), and failed to carry out the balancing
required by Article 52(1) of the Charter. On the other hand, even the
analysis carried out under the Directive's provisions is far from
satisfactory-as will be discussed later.
211. See Charter, supra note 18, art. 52(1).
212. See id. art. 52(3).
213. See, e.g., Christopher Kuner, The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data
Protection and Internet Search Engines, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Law, Society, and Economy Working Paper Series, Mar. 28, 2015,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496060 [perma.cc/2FE4-JLJM]; Stefan Kulk and Frederik Zuiderveen
Borgesius, Google Spain v. Gonzilez: Did the Court Forget About Freedom of Expression?, 3 EUR.
J. OF RISK REG. 389 (2014); see Hoboken, supra note 167; Christopher Rees and Debbie Heywood,
The 'Right to be Forgotten' Or the 'Principle That Has Been Remembered; 30 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 574 (2014); Eleni Frantziou, Further Developments in the Right to be Forgotten:
The European Court of Justice's Judgment in Case C- 131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc. v.
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 14 HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 761 (2014); Michael L. Rustad
and Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be Forgotten To Enable Transatlantic Data
Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349 (2015).
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1. The Balancing Under the Directive Provisions
The court explicitly assumed that the data processing carried
out by the search engine may find a legitimate basis under Article
7(f).214 Under this provision, personal data may be processed without
the data subject's consent where
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where
such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).215
Thus, Article 7(f) considers on the one hand the "legitimate interest" of
the controller-according to the court in this case, the search
engine-and those of the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed-which in this case are the users who search for information
on the basis of the data subject's name. Those interests constitute a
legitimate ground for the processing only if they are not overridden by
the data subject's fundamental rights to privacy and data protection.
Therefore, a balancing analysis is needed under this provision.
216
Actually, all of the balancing the Google Spain court engaged in came
down to this particular provision.
The court started this analysis by considering how the
processing carried out by the search engine is liable to interfere
seriously with a data subject's rights when a search is made on the
basis of an individual's name.217 Then the court stated, "In the light of
the potential seriousness of that interference, it is clear that it cannot
be justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of such
an engine has in that processing."218 As a result, the first element of
the balancing envisioned in Article 7(f) was already decided against
the controller. That is, the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller could not be a ground for legitimate data processing. The
remaining factor under Article 7(f) was whether the processing could
be grounded on the legitimate interest pursued by those to whom the
data are disclosed-that is, by the users-or whether such an interest
is also overridden by the data subject rights. The court stated that "a
fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and
the data subject's fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the
214. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 73.
215. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 23, art. 7(f). Article 1(1) refers to the
protection of "the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data."
216. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 74.
217. Id. 80.
218. Id. 81 (emphasis added).
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Charter,"219 only to immediately declare that "the data subject's rights
protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, that
interest of internet users."220 This "general rule" notwithstanding, the
court held:
[Blalance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in
question and its sensitivity for the data subject's private life and on the interest of the
public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according
to the role played by the data subject in public life.
2 2 1
This analysis is the entirety of the balancing exercise advanced
by the CJEU. The ruling did mention that a balancing is also needed
under Article 14(a) to determine whether the data subject may object
"on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation
to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise
provided by national legislation.'222 According to the court, that
balancing "enables account to be taken in a more specific manner of all
the circumstances surrounding the data subject's particular
situation.'223 However, the CJEU never elaborated on that point, nor
gave any clue as to how that balancing should be carried out.
Confining the balancing analysis to the elements set forth in
Article 7(f) could hardly result in a satisfactory outcome. For one
thing, that provision does not consider the interests of the
publisher.224 Moreover, the language of Article 7(f) led the CJEU to
depict the balance as one between the data subject's fundamental
rights and the "legitimate interests of internet users potentially
interested in having access to that information. ' 225 In addition, the
controller's interest was considered to be of a mere economic nature.2 26
Such a starting point allowed the CJEU to perceive the "interests" of
either the controller or the users as omething less valuable than the
data subject's fundamental rights.227 This outcome shows that such a
219. Id. (emphasis added).




224. See Kranenborg, supra note 193, at 78 (noting that the Court was able to leave the
interests of the publisher out of the analysis because they are not considered under Article 7(f)).
225. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 81 (emphasis added).
226. Id. 81, 97; see Lindsay, supra note 204, at 178 (noting that "in the required
balancing exercise the Court placed little weight on the interests of operators, which it identified
as purely economic").
227. See Frantziou, supra note 213, at 769 ('The judgment mislabels a widely protected
fundamental right as an 'interest', subjects it to a presumption of non- applicability and hence
fails to take account of its equal weight in the 'fair balance' discussion."); see also Kuner, supra
note 213, at 13.
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balancing, if it can be understood as such,228 is not enough to achieve a
result consistent with the Charter. In fact, if the result of Article 7(f)
analysis would favor the data subject, she would have a right to stop
the data processing under the Directive. However, that right should
still be confronted with other fundamental rights at stake-not merely
interests.
Still, under the Directive provisions, the CJEU noted that the
balancing under Article 7(f) could lead to a different outcome in the
case of data processing carried out by the publisher and notably stated
that, while the publisher's processing might be covered by national
law exceptions under Article 9 (for processing carried out solely for
journalistic purposes), this "does not appear to be so" in the case of a
search engine.229 The court's understanding of Article 9 in Google
Spain thus departed from the broader interpretation it had held in a
previous judgment-the Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan
Markkinaporssi Oy, Satamedia Oy case.230 In Satamedia, the CJEU
understood "journalistic activities" as those whose sole objective is
"the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas,
irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them" and that
"[t/hey are not limited to media undertakings and may be undertaken
for profit-making purposes.
''231
2. The (Missing) Balancing Under the Charter Provisions
The fundamental rights which may be affected as a
consequence of asserting a data subject's right to be delisted-as an
expression of their fundamental rights to privacy and to data
protection recognized in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter-are those of
freedom of expression and information as well as freedom to conduct
business (enshrined in Articles 11 and 16 of the Charter, respectively).
Article 52(1) of the Charter prescribes:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
2 32
228. See Frantziou, supra note 213, at 769 (noting that "seeking to balance rights against
interests is questionable as a matter of principle").
229. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 1 85.
230. Case C 73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy, Satamedia
Oy (Dec. 16, 2008), http://curia.europa.euljuris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=76075
&doclang=EN [perma.cc/KP6M-NS59].
231. See id. 61.
232. See Charter, supra note 18, art. 52(1).
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As noted, the CJEU neither engaged in weighing whether
those rights might in fact be limited by the right to be delisted nor
whether such a limitation would meet the criteria set forth in Article
52(1). The search engine's fundamental right of freedom to conduct
business was not even mentioned in the judgment,233 which only
considered the economic "interests" of the search engine under the
balancing required by Article 7(f).234 There, the CJEU established
what appears to be an absolute presumption that such interests will
always be overridden by the data subject's rights.235 This stands in
contrast with the CJEU's own approach in ASNEF and FECEMD.
236
There, in a case involving the interests of direct marketing companies
as controllers, the court rejected that Spanish law could establish an
additional requirement within Article 7(f) for certain categories of
personal data "definitively prescribing, for those categories, the result
of the balancing of the opposing rights and interests, without allowing
a different result by virtue of the particular circumstances of an
individual case"237 and stressed the need to leave the outcome of the
balancing open.
The fundamental right to freedom of expression was not
considered in the balancing either-beyond the brief mention
regarding the Directive's media exception. A fair analysis, however,
should consider whether the publisher may rely on the right to
freedom of expression in order to have its content disseminated
through search engines and whether the search engine may also be
exercising that right when displaying the search results.238 It is
commonly argued that Google Spain does not really affect freedom of
233. In contrast, the AG reminded that "[ain internet search engine service provider
lawfully exercises both his freedom to conduct business and freedom of expression when he
makes available internet information location tools relying on a search engine." See AG Opinion,
supra note 101, 132.
234. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 81.
235. Id.
236. ASNEF and FECEMD, supra note 54, 47.
237. See id. 47; Steve Peers, The CJEU's Google Spain Judgment, EU LAW ANALYSIS
(May 13, 2014), [perma.cc/A6PK-JYUT] (noting that while in ASNEF and FECEMD the CJEU
"criticised the Spanish law for its automaticity, because it failed to weigh up the interests of
companies and data subjects in individual cases," here "it is the Court which sets out an
automatic test").
238. See Erdos, supra note 49 ("[The CJEU also studiously refused to acknowledge that
regulation of the index of a search engine engaged freedom of expression, rather arguing only
that this implicated 'the economic interest of the operator of the search engine' and 'the interest
of the general public in finding that information."'); see also van Hoboken, supra note 167, at 1;
Orla Lynskey, Rising Like a Phoenix: The 'Right to be Forgotten' Before the ECJ, EUR. L. BLOG
(May 13, 2014), http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2351 [perma.cc/N3CC-AP65]; Peers, supra note
237. For more on search engines' legal claims under the right to freedom of expression, see JORIS
VAN HOBOKEN, SEARCH ENGINE FREEDOM: ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION FOR THE LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF WEB SEARCH ENGINES (2012).
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expression, because, after delisting, the content is still available on the
original source.239 However, the obscurity that stems from delisting
search engine's links to the information does affect freedom of
expression, at least to some extent. And, in any event, permanence in
the origin website is not mandated by the ruling as a condition to
ensure a balanced outcome. In fact, a data subject might also request
the deletion in the original source, and the web publisher might be
obliged to accommodate such a request if the publisher's processing
happens to go against the Directive provisions or the data subject has
compelling grounds to object to it-unless the web publisher is covered
by the media exception.
Moreover, no reference was made to the fact that the right to
receive information is also a fundamental right under the Charter.
Under Article 11 of the Charter, the right to freedom of expression and
information "shall include freedom . . . to receive ... information and
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers."240 As noted earlier, this fundamental right was dealt with
as a mere "interest," which the CJEU held would be overridden, as a
rule, by the data subject's rights.
241
Finally, no mention was made in the ruling regarding the need
to take into account European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case
law as to the meaning and scope of the rights contained in the Charter
which correspond to rights included in the ECHR, as required under
Article 52(3) of the Charter.242 This is particularly relevant, as the
ECtHR has already repeatedly dealt with the interplay between the
rights to freedom of expression and to privacy (Articles 10 and 8 of the
ECHR, respectively) and held that both deserve equal respect as a
matter of principle.
243
239. See, e.g., Mythbuster: The Court of Justice of the EU and the "Right to be Forgotten"
EUR. COMM'N (Sept. 9, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/newsl
140918_en.htm [perma.ccNY22C-Z3HS]; see also WP29 Guidelines, supra note 201, 9.
240. See Charter, supra note 18, art. 11, which uses the same language as Article 10 of
the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stressed the fact that the right to
receive information is part of this right. See ECtHR (2nd Section), December 10, 2012, Yildirim
v. Turkey (App. No. 3111/10), 71 50-55.
241. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, 7 97; see also Bunn, supra note 199, at 343 (noting
that this fails to consider the extent to which the interference on the users' rights is
proportionate in protecting the data subject's rights); see also Rees & Heywood, supra note 213,
at 578 ('The CJEU's failure to give any serious weight to the public interest in having access to
information (other than in limited circumstances) is likely to be the focus of future cases.").
242. See Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 213; see also Frantziou, supra note 213, at 773.
243. While in a different set of circumstances, the ECtHR has underscored that "it is not
the role of judicial authorities to engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the
public domain of all traces of publications which have in the past been found, by final judicial
decisions, to amount to unjustified attacks on individual reputations." See ECtHR (4th Section),
July 16, 2013, Wvgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland (App. No. 33846/07), 7 65,
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V. LOOKING AHEAD
A. The Right to Be Delisted Under the New General Data Protection
Regulation
The Data Protection Directive will soon be replaced by a new
statute, the General Data Protection Regulation, which was proposed
by the EU Commission in January 2012, is expected to be finally
adopted in 2016, and would enter into force in 2018.244 The GDPR
does not substantially change the basic concepts that allowed the
CJEU to find a right to be delisted from search engine results under
the Directive. The notions of "processing" and of "controller" remain
essentially unchanged to that effect.245 In addition, Article 7(f) of the
Directive, under which the balancing was carried out in Google Spain,
will be replaced by an almost identical provision-Article 6(1)(f) of the
GDPR.
246
However, the GDPR does include a specific provision that in
the final draft is titled "Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten') 247 and
that has been the subject of much academic commentary since it was
originally proposed.24  Nonetheless, the provision does not deal
specifically with search engines. It also does not establish with
particularity a data subject's right to request the delisting of links
displayed in search engines' results for name-specific queries-in
short, it does not codify Google Spain. Rather, the GDPR sets forth a
general right to erasure, imposing on the controller the obligation to
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intJeng?i=001-122365 [perma.ccIHPU8-QD6D]; see Frantziou, supra note
213, at 774 (noting that while Google Spain "is not necessarily incompatible with the ECHR, the
Strasbourg Court's judgment in Wggrzynowski and Smolczewski suggests that such
incompatibility cannot be ruled out either").
244. See GDPR final draft, supra note 7.
245. Id. arts. 4(3), 4(5).
246. The proposed Article 6(1)(f) GDPR introduces a specific consideration to the case
where the data subject is a child. On the other hand, that provision refers generally to the
legitimate interests pursued "by a third party," instead of "by the third party or parties to whom
the data are disclosed." See id. art. 6(1)(f) (emphasis added).
247. Id. art. 17; see Christiana Markou, The 'Right to Be Forgotten': Ten Reasons Why It
Should Be Forgotten, in REFORMING EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 203 (Serge Gutwirth,
Ronald Leenes & Paul de Hert eds., 2015) (criticizing the choice of this title for the proposed
article).
248. See, e.g., Meg Leta Ambrose, It's About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, And
The Right To Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 382 (2013); Alessandro Mantelero, The
EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation and the Roots of the 'Right to Be
Forgotten,' 29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 229 (2012); Paul De Hert & Vagelis
Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data Protection Regulation Replacing Directive 95/46/EC: A
Sound System for the Protection of Individuals, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130, 137
(2012); Rosen, supra note 11, at 88; Rolf H. Weber, On the Search for an Adequate Scope of the
Right to Be Forgotten, 6 JIPITEC 2, 2 (2015).
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erase the data in a number of cases, which-to a large extent-were,
at least implicitly, already considered under the Directive. For
example, the right to erasure will apply to cases where the data are no
longer necessary in relation to the purposes of the processing; where
the data subject appropriately objects to the processing or withdraws
consent and there is no other legal ground for the processing; or where
the data have been unlawfully processed.249 The main novelty-which
supposedly would warrant the language "right to be forgotten" in the
title of the Article-is a further obligation of the controller. According
to Article 17(2a):
Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to
paragraph 1 to erase the data, the controller, taking account of available technology and
the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to
inform controllers which are processing the data, that the data subject has requested
the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of that personal
data.
2 5 0
The GDPR does not contain a provision dealing with the
intermediary role of search engines; nor does it address the Google
Spain ruling's shortcomings identified above. Nonetheless, the GDPR
might offer a better opportunity to include freedom of expression and
information into the analysis. First, remarkably, the provision on the
right to be forgotten, Article 17, states explicitly that the controller's
obligation shall not apply to the extent that data processing is
necessary "for exercising the right of freedom of expression and
information.' 251 Second, the language of the provision equivalent to
the Directive's "media exception," Article 80, appears to broaden its
scope. The exception, which must be established by EU Member
States, aims more generally to reconcile data protection rights with
"the right to freedom of expression and information, including the
processing of personal data for journalistic purposes and the purposes
of academic, artistic or literary expression.
'252
B. Practical Fixes
In the absence of a more general solution, the only practical
way to bypass some of the shortcomings identified in the Google Spain
judgment seems to be a careful application by national courts and
DPAs that takes into account all of the rights at stake. The
characterization of search engines as controllers with regards to
content data, even if inconsistent with the role of an intermediary,
249. See GDPR final draft, supra note 7, art. 17.
250. Id. art. 17(2a).
251. Id. art. 17(3)(a).
252. Id. art. 80(1) (emphasis added).
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cannot be avoided unless the CJEU changes its approach.
Nonetheless, national courts and DPAs can use their discretion in
applying the CJEU's interpretation criteria to particular cases, thus
using the little room the CJEU actually conceded (for instance: "as a
rule" does not mean "always") and can resort to the Charter's
provisions.
As the CJEU noted in Lindqvist, it is "at the stage of the
application at national level of the legislation implementing Directive
95/46 in individual cases that a balance must be found between the
rights and interests involved. '253 It also stated, "In that context,
fundamental rights have a particular importance," noting that
freedom of expression had to be weighed against the protection of
private life in the specific case before it. Consequently, the court
noted:
[lit is for the authorities and courts of the Member States not only to interpret their
national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do
not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights
protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles of
Community law, such as inter alia the principle of proportionality.
2 54
In applying the right to be delisted to particular cases, national
courts and DPAs should carry out a careful balancing, both within the
Directive-or the GDPR when it enters into force-and under the
criteria established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Both a
full consideration of the particular circumstances of the case under the
Directive and the unavoidable balancing with other rights under the
Charter may lead to outcomes that while protecting the data subject's
rights, are also respectful with the other rights at issue.
Ultimately, though, this is just a partial solution, as the vast
majority of cases will be dealt with only by search engines-only a
fraction of the search engines' decisions against delisting are likely to
be appealed before courts or DPAs. This trend underscores again the
problematic outcome of Google Spain, which vests private companies
with the power to determine how the balancing will be carried out in
practice.255 Such a question, though, can only be properly addressed
with legislative intervention.
256
253. Lindqvist, supra note 50, 85.
254. Id. 87.
255. See Lindsay, supra note 204, at 178.
256. See Alessandro Mantelero, Finding a Solution to the Google's Dilemma on the 'Right
to Be Forgotten, After the 'Political' ECJ Decision, ICT LAW AND DATA PROTECTION (Nov. 19,
2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528565 [perma.cdEB87-RQEV] (proposing that the GDPR
include a provision excluding the direct enforcement by search engines and requiring filing a
complaint before a court or a DPA, with an initial temporary delisting of the challenged links
conditioned to the filing of the complaint).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In its landmark Google Spain judgment, the Court of Justice of
the European Union devised what may be labeled a "right to be
delisted" as a solution to the problems posed to individuals by search
engines' results implicating personal information about them. The
CJEU tackled this issue resorting to data protection law and held that
under the current Data Protection Directive-construed in the light of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which explicitly includes the
right to the protection of personal data-an individual may request
that some results no longer be displayed from a search carried out on
the basis of her name.
The CJEU tried to reach a balanced outcome by crafting a
somewhat narrow right: it only referred to the possibility of requesting
the delisting of search results in searches made on the basis of the
individual's name, leaving the content available through the use of
different search terms. However, the conditions to exercise this
right-for instance, that the content is inadequate, irrelevant, or no
longer relevant-are overly vague. Moreover, the right is neither
limited to cases where private information is involved; nor does it
require the content to be inaccurate, unlawful, or even to cause harm.
The reason for this extremely broad scope is to be found in the legal
field to which the CJEU resorted-data protection law. EU data
protection law is a very powerful instrument that needs some
counterbalances to avoid certain far-reaching results that its
all-embracing scope may enable. The court arguably failed to devise
appropriate criteria to balance data protection with competing rights
recognized by the Charter, particularly that of freedom of expression
and information.
The potentially harmful interference a person may face when
some compromising content pops up after querying his or her name
online can hardly be overstated. The solution provided, however, has
proven to be highly controversial-particularly when seen from other
legal traditions, but within Europe as well. This Article has chosen
not to delve into the more ideological debate prompted by the ruling,
but has instead chosen to explore the soundness and weaknesses of
the grounds on which the right to be delisted is built and to expound
on the nuances of EU law to contribute to a better understanding of
some of the less-obvious features of the newly recognized right to be
delisted.
In addition to the drawbacks deriving from both the arguably
flawed balance envisioned by the CJEU and the unintended
consequences that may follow from the lack of incentives for search
engines to challenge the delisting requests, a more fundamental
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problem resides in the constraints imposed by the legal framework on
which the right to be delisted is grounded. Indeed, such framework
does not allow for the recognition of the intermediary role played by
generalist search engines. In order to impose on search engines the
duty to assess individuals' requests and to accommodate them when
justified, the CJEU needs to consider search engines as data
controllers of the personal data included in the indexed websites.
Nonetheless, such a characterization is arguably at odds with search
engines' intermediary role and actually makes their activity-in the
absence of specific safeguards-largely incompatible with the data
protection legal framework. The intermediary role of generalist
search engines should be adequately protected under EU law, both
under data protection law and under the general scheme of liability
limitation set forth in the E-Commerce Directive. Only then might a
"right to be delisted," with all the necessary limitations and due
account of the competing rights, be established on solid ground.

